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Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry: Implications for Innovation, 
Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy 
Claude E. Barfield* 
Mark A. Groombridge** 
INTRODUCTION 
A.  The Argument 
Based upon an extensive analysis of the most recent economic 
and legal literature, the goal of this article is to evaluate the impact 
of parallel trade on the pharmaceutical industry and on the intellec-
tual property protection granted through the patent system.  Paral-
lel trade occurs when differences in national economic, social, le-
gal or regulatory regimes result in different prices among 
countries, creating opportunities for arbitrage. 
Parallel trade can take place through several means, but typi-
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cally a distributor will obtain a product in a low-price country and 
ship it to an unauthorized distributor in a high-price country, who 
will then compete directly with the patent holder or the authorized 
distributor in that country.1 
The economics of parallel trade present some of the most com-
plicated challenges to the international trading system, and much 
work remains to be done in this area.  There is very little empirical 
research published, and most of the benefits and costs related to 
parallel imports have yet to be quantified.  To be sure, quantifica-
tion of parallel trade, which by definition occurs outside authorized 
distribution channels, is inherently difficult.  Our conclusions are 
thus based largely on an analysis of the theoretical literature and on 
the more practical evidence adduced from the experience of private 
sector companies. 
We should like to emphasize from the outset that the focus of 
the analysis and conclusions set forth in this article relate primarily 
to the pharmaceutical industry, though in some areas the points 
made are valid for the entire patent system, or even for copyrights 
and trademarks.  The authors are aware that the rationale for patent 
is different in important respects from copyright and trademarks, 
respectively.  We use the term ‘intellectual property’ collectively 
because it tracks the common usage of the literature in this area. 
The overall rationale for the patent system stems from the be-
lief that unfettered competition will produce too little innovation 
unless inventors are given market power for a limited time in order 
to block relatively costless imitation of new products.2  Agreement 
on this proposition, however, leaves many questions hanging re-
garding a proper balance of rights between the inventor and soci-
ety.  Most economists would argue that in an ideal world, this bal-
 
1. Some analysts distinguish between active and passive parallel trade: in the 
passive mode, arbitrageurs buy in a low-price country and sell in a high-price coun-
try; in the active mode, a foreign licensee enters the domestic market himself to 
compete with the patent holder or his licensee.  See Carsten Fink, Entering the Jun-
gle of Intellectual Property Rights Exhaustion and Parallel Imports, MIMEO 1, (April 
1999). 
2. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). The authors acknowl-
edge that parallel trade is not just an intellectual property issue. Restrictions on par-
allel trade for products not covered by intellectual property rules have included phy-
tosanitary regulations, contracts, and (unfortunately) import restrictions. 
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ance would be made on a case-by-case (product or sector) basis.  
As economist Keith Maskus has noted: 
In theory, the appropriate balance of incentives would de-
pend on numerous market characteristics in each product or 
artistic area.  These characteristics include prospective de-
mand, potential spillovers, the costs of research and devel-
opment (R&D), impacts on market structure, and competi-
tive aspects of the economy.  Many of these factors are 
uncertain at the time [intellectual property right] decisions 
are made, suggesting that finely tuned policies are unwork-
able.  Rather, [intellectual property rights] must be based 
on generally applicable standards rather than on a case-by-
case system.3 
Building upon this insight, we shall argue that there are special 
characteristics and circumstances relating to the research-based 
pharmaceuticals industry justifying rules that allow companies to 
control parallel trade.  Specifically, economists have identified at 
least four market settings in which parallel trade is likely to reduce 
economic welfare; and the pharmaceutical industry exhibits ele-
ments of all four characteristics.  These cases, or settings, are: 
In high-technology industries, particularly those with a high ra-
tio of sunk joint R&D costs, where parallel imports will inhibit the 
ability of firms to recoup R&D and other fixed costs and ultimately 
reduce their ability to innovate; 
In situations where price discrimination (differential pricing) 
will enhance welfare by facilitating entry into new, low-priced 
markets and thus expanding output; 
In cases where monopsony power by public authorities creates 
price distortions and drives price down below average fixed costs; 
and 
In countries where free rider problems exist because parallel 
imports can freeze out authorized distributors through lower prices, 
thus undercutting information and service activities. 
 
 
3. Keith E. Maskus, The International Regulation of Intellectual Property, 134 
WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV: REVIEW OF WORLD ECONOMICS 188 (1998). 
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Critics of the argument we advance maintain that: 
The problem [of parallel imports] no longer can be looked 
at from an exclusive perspective of maximizing intellectual 
property rights.  It has to be dealt with from a perspective 
of creating equal level playing fields, avoiding distortions 
of market access and providing, at the same time, adequate 
protection of investment.4 
We agree that it is important to incorporate these other perspec-
tives but still maintain that on balance, the negative consequences 
of parallel trade, particularly in the research-based pharmaceutical 
industry, would greatly outweigh any limited and short-term bene-
fits.5  Moreover, even if it were true that market distortions were 
taking place due to the anti-competitive actions of pharmaceutical 
companies, there are better mechanisms already in place to address 
such actions, specifically, anti-trust laws that counter abusive mo-
nopolistic practices. 
After considering the available theoretical literature and the 
empirical evidence and practical experience that has been amassed 
over the past decade, this article concludes that a doctrine of inter-
national exhaustion of patent rights that would allow unrestricted 
parallel trade of pharmaceutical products would likely result in de-
creased economic welfare for producers—and consumers.  An ef-
fective patent system depends on much more than laws concerning 
patent-length and penalties on infringement.  An effective patent 
system also depends on the ability by the patent holder to control 
the distribution of its patented pharmaceuticals—a system that 
would be greatly undermined in a world of unfettered parallel im-
ports.  We agree with Patricia Danzon, who argues that allowing 
patent holders in the pharmaceutical industry to control parallel 
trade is a “normal competitive constraint . . . [that] is consistent 
with the purpose of patent protection, whereas competition from 
 
4. Thomas Cottier, The WTO System and Exhaustion of Rights 1 (Draft manu-
script presented at the Conference on the Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights 
and Parallel Importation in World Trade, Geneva, Switzerland) (November 6-7, 
1998). 
5. See Claude E. Barfield and Mark A. Groombridge, The Economic Case for 
Copyright Holder Control over Parallel Imports, 1 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 903 
(1998). 
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perfect substitutes, as occurs with parallel trade, undermines the 
intent of patent.”6 
 
B. Intellectual Property Rights and the Multilateral Trading 
System 
Though this article focuses its main attention on the particular 
issues related to the pharmaceutical industry, some discussion is 
warranted of the larger context of developments relating to intel-
lectual property rights (“IPRs”) in national and international re-
gimes.  In January 1995 for the first time, intellectual property 
rights were brought into the multilateral trading system with the 
signing of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS).7  
The establishment of TRIPS in the WTO reflects the growing 
demand for increased intellectual property protection.  It also 
reflects major changes in the dynamics of international competition 
and the growth of knowledge industries as the central elements of 
comparative advantage among the developed economies.  There is 
both general and specific evidence for this evolution. 
Over the past two decades, enormous public and private 
resources have been poured into research and development  
projects.  In 1996, developed countries spent over $600 billion (US 
$250 billion) on R&D,8 with the developing countries spending 
about $100 billion — a figure highly skewed by sizeable 
proportions coming from East Asia, India, China and Brazil.9  
Meanwhile, global direct investment, an important indicator of 
technology transfer, increased fourfold between 1982 and 1994, 
doubling as a percentage of world gross domestic product (from 4 
 
6. Patricia M. Danzon, The Economics of Parallel Trade, 13 Pharmaeconomics 
301 (March 1998). 
7. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
April 15, 1995, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 
I.L.M. 81 (1994)[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
8.  See Carlos A. Primo Braga et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic 
Development, TECHNET WORKING PAPER, 10 (July 1, 1999). 
9.  See id. at 11. 
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to 9 percent).10  Two more direct indicators of increased 
international economic activities in knowledge-based  products 
were the surge in export growth in high-technology sectors, which 
from 1980 through 1994 doubled as a percentage of total world 
exports (12 to 24 percent);11 and a huge increase in the demand for 
intellectual property protection.12  Using the periods 1981-1982 
and 1994-1995 as baselines, the number of patents granted more 
than doubled, from 320,000 to 670,000; and the number of 
trademark registrations increased 2.6 fold, from 420,000 to 1.1 
million.13 
Before discussing the substantive implications of these changes 
for the multilateral trading systems, two political economy facts 
should be posited.  First, as one commentator has pointed out: 
“[T]he growing capacity of manufacturers in developing countries 
to penetrate distant markets for traditional industrial products has 
forced the developed countries to rely more heavily on their 
comparative advantages in the production of intellectual goods 
than in the past.”14  Second, in many sectors — and this is 
particularly the case with pharmaceuticals—the combination of a 
disproportionate rise in the cost of research, with a decreased 
product cycle and increasing vulnerability to free-riding imitation, 
has given stronger urgency to political pressure to upgrade IPR 
protection. 
The TRIPS Agreements, while lauded as an important step in 
addressing the concerns of industries dependent upon IPR protec-
tion, leaves some issues unresolved.  One particular standout is the 
issue of exhaustion of patent and other intellectual property rights.  
Under a system of national exhaustion, a patent holder can prevent 
parallel importation of his product from a foreign country, where it 
is sold either by the IPRs owner himself or by an authorized dealer.  
International exhaustion in the case of patents means that as soon 
 
10. See id. at 14. 
11. See id. at 13. 
12. See id. at 15. 
13. See id. at 16. 
14. See J.H. Reichman,  Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property 
Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement,  29 INT’L LAW. 
345, 346 (1995). 
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as a product is put on the market of any WTO member by the 
holder of a patent or with his consent, the patent can no longer 
block the importation of that product in any other WTO country.15 
So divided were WTO members on the issue of the exhaustion 
of IPRs that the TRIPS Agreement explicitly acknowledged this 
lack of consensus.16  This should come as little surprise as the de-
bate on parallel trade and the issue of exhaustion incorporates as-
pects of competition policy and passionate debates concerning the 
relationship between advanced-industrialized countries and less-
advanced developing countries.  As Cottier observes: 
World trade law is only in its beginnings in dealing with 
this careful balance.  While parallel imports amounts to 
perhaps the most central trade-related issues of IPRs, it has 
not been extensively dealt with in negotiations. Within the 
TRIPS Agreement it was mainly agreed to disagree, and 
leave the matter for further work.17 
Indeed, Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement expressly states that: 
“For the purposes of dispute settlement . . . nothing in this Agree-
ment shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intel-
lectual property rights.”18 
The issue of parallel imports represents the first test of the ca-
pability of the WTO to reconcile these competing principles and 
fulfill the obligations implicit in the decision to bring intellectual 
property rights into the multilateral trading regime.  A frequent ar-
gument in favor of parallel imports and international exhaustion is 
that a system that allows restrictions on parallel imports conflicts 
with the basic principles of free trade that undergird the WTO.  
Frederick Abbott of the International Trade Law Committee 
(ITLC) states  “the premise [is] that restrictions on the free move-
ment of goods and services legitimately placed on the world mar-
ket are inconsistent with the underlying objective of the GATT-
 
15. See Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Exhaustion of Patent Rights Under WTO 
Law, J. WORLD TRADE, October 1998, at 137. 
16. See TRIPS Agreement art. 6. 
17. Cottier, supra note 4. 
18. TRIPS Agreement art. 6. 
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WTO system.”19  That being the case, he bluntly argues that: 
[I]n light of the inherent tension between IPR-based territo-
rial restrictions and the rules of the GATT 1994 . . . pro-
moting the free movement of goods and services, it may be 
necessary to give priority to one set of values over the 
other.  It is suggested here that the WTO Agreement places 
a priority on the liberalization of markets . . . as opposed to 
strict neutrality or a converse presumption.”20 
Against this view, we make two arguments: one is that, without 
quibbling over the terms of ‘equality,’ the TRIPS Agreement 
should at least be interpreted in a manner which does not under-
mine its very premises.  Thus, in legal terms, we agree with 
Bronckers, who has written: 
As a matter of principle, one may ask whether any issue of 
intellectual property protection can still be tackled or at-
tacked on the basis of other WTO rules, notably the 
GATT’s principles.  Proponents of international exhaustion 
have suggested that the overarching principle of the WTO 
is open trade or trade liberalization, a principle which is 
also supposed to guide the interpretation of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  However, that view is one-sided.  It does not 
comport with the text and objectives of the TRIPS Agree-
ment [which is sui generis]. 
… 
 Indeed, the TRIPS Agreement balances two principles: 
trade liberalization as well as increased intellectual prop-
erty protection, with the restrictions on trade this entails.21 
On the even more basic issue of free trade versus IPRs, we 
would argue that the alleged contradiction stems from a failure to 
acknowledge the premises and implications upon which IPRs are 
 
19. See Frederick M. Abbott, Discussion Paper for Conference on Exhaustion 
of Intellectual Property Rights and parallel Importation in World Trade 3 (Draft Pa-
per for Conference on Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Parallel Impor-
tation in World Trade, Geneva, Switzerland) (November 6-7, 1998). 
20. See id. at 7. 
21. Bronckers, supra note 15, at 143-44. 
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based.  IPRs do restrict market forces for a period of time, on the 
assumption that the dynamic effects (effects over time) will pro-
duce greater economic welfare gains for society than would be the 
case without this grant of temporary monopoly.  Here we agree 
with the analysis of economist Carsten Fink who has written exten-
sively on IPRs and the WTO.  Fink states: 
[T]he exhaustion doctrine is primarily an issue of IPRs pol-
icy—and not an issue of free trade or restricted trade.  The 
free trade argument in the context of parallel trade has two 
fundamental shortcomings.  First, the conditions surround 
parallel trade do not fit into the assumptions on which stan-
dard static (short-term effects) trade models supporting the 
case for laissez-faire trade are built.  Second, a static analy-
sis with regard to IPRs is insufficient . . . [it] would require 
the removal of all rights to intellectual property! . . . [T]he 
main rationale for protecting IPRs lies in their dynamic ef-
fects. . . .  By granting exclusive rights and thus enhancing 
market power, rights to intellectual property allow title 
holders to appropriate their investments in creating intellec-
tual property.22 
C.  Plan of the Article 
In mobilizing evidence to support our conclusions, the authors 
organize the article as follows.  In the next section, we discuss the 
extent of the problem and the current situation from a legal per-
spective, both within the WTO and in the national laws of major 
trading nations and blocs such as the European Union (EU).  In 
section II, we briefly review the economics of the patent system, 
with particular reference to issues that have special relevance to the 
pharmaceutical industry, such as the extent of actual monopoly un-
der patents and whether so-called ‘patent races’ decrease economic 
welfare.  Also in this section, we describe in some detail recent 
scientific developments within the pharmaceutical industry and 
why parallel imports would prove particularly damaging in the 
 
22. See Carsten Fink, Does National Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Con-
tradict the Principle of Free trade? 3-4 (Draft Paper for Conference on Exhaustion of 
Intellectual Property rights and Parallel Importation in World Trade, Geneva, Swit-
zerland) (November 6-7, 1998). 
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long-term to the ability of the industry to continue to produce a 
stream of innovative drugs.  In the fourth section, we analyze the 
importance of an effective distribution system to realizing the 
benefits of the patent system.  We also demonstrate how parallel 
imports would undermine economic and physical welfare specifi-
cally in the pharmaceutical industry.  We then set forth the case for 
why the government must play a critical role in adopting and en-
forcing rules allowing patent holders control over parallel imports.  
Finally, the article concludes that at this time pharmaceuticals 
should be exempted from parallel trade. 
I. RECENT ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS ON PARALLEL 
TRADE 
A.  Parallel Imports: The Extent of the Problem 
Markets for parallel imports—gray market goods—are by their 
nature hard to measure, but studies of individual and regional mar-
ket trends demonstrate the likelihood that from a small base such 
imports in pharmaceuticals will grow substantially in future years.  
Already, for example, parallel trade is estimated to account for 
roughly 10 percent of pharmaceutical sales in the European Union, 
where such trade among member states is permitted unless prohib-
ited by private contract.  Further, this percentage jumps steeply 
when one counts only the most profit-making drugs which are still 
bound by patents—about 25 per cent of the total market.23  In addi-
tion, a recent survey of 9 EU pharmaceutical companies conducted 
by the National Association of Economic Research estimated “the 
aggregate loss of revenues for the participating companies in 
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK in 1996 to be 
ECU 323 million.24  This is equivalent to seven percent of the total 
sales revenue of these companies in the markets concerned.”25  The 
same research team also reported a survey in which almost 30 per-
cent of U.S. pharmaceutical exporters to Asia stated that their local 
 
23. See Danzon, The Economics of Parallel Trade, supra note 6, at 294. 
Throughout the paper, we use the terms parallel imports, parallel trade and gray 
market interchangeably. 
24.  National Economic Research Associates (NERA),  Survey of Parallel 
Trade, 2 (May 1997). 
25. Id. at 2. 
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distributors were experiencing problems with lower-priced parallel 
imports.26 
 
It should be noted that these parallel import penetration figures 
do not convey the full potential impact of the phenomenon.  What 
they cannot measure is the extent to which pharmaceutical compa-
nies lower their prices in the higher-price market as a defense 
against price-cutting by parallel imports.  While in the long-run 
this tactic is self-defeating,27 there is evidence that companies are 
adopting this strategy.28 
There are two other current practices which magnify the effect 
of parallel importing in pharmaceuticals: one is the substantial dis-
counting granted to developing countries and the other is the de-
gree that parallel importers target or “cherry pick” the most profit-
able drugs to attack.  For both economic and philanthropic reasons, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers sell a substantial number of drugs to 
developing countries at discount prices.  In recent years, these 
markets have become major outposts for re-exportation back to 
developed countries.  Consequently, Stuart Schweitzer notes that 
increasingly the “threat of cheaper versions of the patented drugs 
reentering the primary markets of the United States, Europe and 
Japan is serious.”29 
The research-based pharmaceutical industry’s ability to de-
velop innovative new drugs, is also jeopardized by the practice of 
“cherry-picking major products.”30  Parallel traders most often 
trade in “sure-bets,” or products just recently released that provide 
the bulk of profits for pharmaceutical companies.  As Burstall and 
Senior note, “In practice parallel importers focus upon the best-
selling, in-patent, branded medicines.  [We] found that in 1990 six 
out of seven of the world’s best selling medicines were parallel 
 
26. See id. 
27. See infra pp 162 - 63. 
28. See PATRICIA DANZON, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULATION: NATIONAL 
POLICIES VERSUS GLOBAL INTERESTS 85-86, (1997). 
29. STUART O. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 229 
(1997). 
30. National Economic Research Associates (NERA), Survey of Parallel Trade, 
(May 1997), Key Conclusions. 
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traded in the European Community.”31  The particular negative 
impact of this practice is underscored by the fact that pharmaceuti-
cal companies often depend on a few so-called “blockbuster drugs” 
for long-term growth and success.32  Thus, the consequence of 
such trade could ultimately substantially undermine investment in 
R&D.  As Warwick Rothnie argues: 
[P]arallel imports affect the most successful drugs.  These 
tend to be the ones with more improved therapeutic bene-
fits, the drugs which it most desirable to encourage.  Drug 
companies are also crucially dependent on them to sustain 
their levels of profitability.  Therefore, greater encourage-
ment of parallel imports is likely to have an exaggerated ef-
fect on both ability and incentives to carry out desirable 
R&D.33 
B.  The Current Legal Situation Regarding Parallel Trade 
Though the legal basis for patent holders to control the impor-
tation of patented goods or processes into the United States is 
fairly strong, recent events both in the United States and in foreign 
countries continue to leave some questions unanswered.  This sec-
tion will describe recent decisions in the United States and in Japan 
and the EU to illustrate the current international complexity re-
garding the right of patent holders to control importation. 
First, in the U. S., decisions relating to parallel trade have been 
influenced and determined by legislative action and by the revolu-
tion in judicial attitudes regarding competition policy in general 
and vertical restraints in particular.  Vertical restraints (also known 
as restrictions or arrangements) are contractual limitations imposed 
by a firm at one stage of production or the distribution process 
upon a firm at a different stage.  Earlier, as Robert Anderson of  
the WTO has noted, there was a “fundamental tension between the 
goals of competition policy and IPRs”; but in recent decades, eco-
nomic thinking has recognized that “voluntary arrangements for 
the licensing of intellectual property can enable firms to work to-
 
31. M.L. BURSTALL AND I.S.T. SENIOR, UNDERMINING INNOVATION: PARALLEL 
TRADE IN PRESCRIPTION MEDICINES 24 (1992). 
32. See infra, pp. 24. 
33. WARWICK A. ROTHNIE, PARALLEL IMPORTS 505 (1993). 
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gether (more) efficiently. . .and that ‘restrictive’ contractual ar-
rangements such as. . .territorial market restraints, while capable of 
restricting competition in particular market circumstances, are of-
ten employed by firms for legitimate, pro-competitive purposes.” 34  
In the 1977 Sylvania case, the Supreme Court adopted the basic 
premises of the new economic thinking and established a “rule of 
reason” standard for judging vertical restrictions by manufacturers 
over dealers or retailers in the U.S. domestic market.35 
In addition, under current U.S. law the patent owner has the 
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, sell-
ing, or importing the patented invention.36  Under section 261 of 
title 35 of the United States Code, the patent owner can impose and 
enforce territorial restrictions in the United States on sales on dis-
tributors. 
Despite the statutory base and the favorable ruling in Sylvania, 
a second doctrine, the so-called ‘first sale doctrine,’ continues to 
complicate judicial views regarding parallel imports.  Under the 
first sale doctrine, in the domestic market the patent (or copyright) 
holder cannot control or dictate the terms of distribution of a pat-
ented product once ownership has been transferred.37 
As Rothnie has noted, three arguments have been advanced de-
fending the limitation: one is explicitly economic, to wit that the 
patent owner has received full value for the patent in the first sale; 
a second relates to the doctrine of “alienation of rights” or the right 
of the purchaser to exercise control a good once a legitimate sale 
has taken place; and the third, more broadly stems from a general 
 
34. Robert D. Anderson, “The Interface Between Competition Policy and Intel-
lectual Property in the Context of the International Trading System,” Journal of In-
ternational Economic Law, vol. 1, no. 4 (1998), p. 659, and passim; for a second de-
tailed discussion of the interface between competition policy and IPRs see, Rothnie, 
pp. 150-185. 
35. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
36. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994). 
37. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT § 16.03(2)(a) (1998); see also Neel 
Chatterjee, Imperishable Intellectual Creations: The Limits of the First Sale Doc-
trine, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 383, 387 (1995)(defining the 
first sale doctrine as applied to copyrighted works). 
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antagonism to monopolies and the desire to limit their effect.38 
 
38. See ROTHNIE, supra note 33, at 259-60. 
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Regarding infringement on patents by parallel imports into the 
United States, in general courts continue to uphold the territorial 
nature of the patent against claims of universal exhaustion.39  In 
some lower court cases, however, judges have proved susceptible 
to arguments that allege that patent holders, through restricting 
parallel imports, are receiving “double profits” out of proportion to 
their contribution to the economic welfare of the country.40 
During the TRIPS negotiations, U.S. negotiators successfully 
argued that the ‘right of importation’ be included among the rights 
conferred to patent holders in the new TRIPS Agreement. Thus, 
Article 28 of TRIPS grants patent owners (for both products and 
processes) “exclusive rights . . . to prevent third parties, not having 
the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for 
sale, selling or importing” said products or processes.41 
In order to bring U.S. law fully into congruence with the new 
TRIPS, in 1994 Congress amended the U.S. patent law to provide 
that “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells 
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the 
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent 
therefor,  infringes the patent.”42  Thus, at this point, there is full 
statutory backing for U.S. patent holders to block parallel imports, 
and there is no longer the necessity to rely on disparate court deci-
sions.  For pharmaceuticals, on health and safety grounds, Con-
gress in 1987 banned the reimportation of pharmaceutical products 
except by the original manufacturer.43 
While for patents the statutory foundation is strong, a recent 
case involving copyrights and parallel imports has created confu-
sion regarding the ultimate position of the U.S. regarding IPRs and 
competing non-pirated imports.  In March 1998, a unanimous Su-
preme Court held that once a lawfully made product had been sold 
in an authorized manner—a “first sale,” in other words—the copy-
 
39. See Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697 (1890). 
40. For a discussion of these cases, see ROTHNIE, supra note 33, at 170-85. 
41. TRIPS Agreement art. 28; see also, Bronckers, supra note 15, at 141-42; 
see also, Harvey E. Bale, Jr., The Conflict Between Parallel Trade and Product Ac-
cess and Innovation: The Case of Pharmaceuticals,  1998 J. INT’L ECON. L.  638. 
42. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994). 
43. See Bale, supra note 41, at 651. 
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right owner had no further control over the product’s fate.44 
Though the legal history and foundation for restricting parallel 
imports is much different in the patent area, the press widely trum-
peted the ruling as a triumph for unrestricted parallel trade in gen-
eral.  Linda Greenhouse of The New York Times wrote: “The deci-
sion was a victory for those who champion what are sometimes 
called ‘parallel imports’ as an example of free trade that benefits 
American consumers.”45  Justice John Paul Stevens, who wrote the 
opinion, rather sweepingly opined that: “[t]he whole point of the 
first sale doctrine is that once the copyright owner places a copy-
righted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has ex-
hausted his exclusive statutory right to control its distribution.”46 
In the EU, there is a dual stance regarding parallel imports.  In 
the zeal to create a common market, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in the 1970s handed down a series of decisions which 
adopted a doctrine of “international exhaustion” within the EU, al-
lowing no restrictions on parallel trade among members of the 
community unless stipulated by private contract.47  At the same 
time, the ECJ indicated that parallel imports from nations outside 
the EU would be treated differently and the territorial nature of 
IPRs would hold sway.48 
A recent case has underscored the bifurcated EU approach.  In 
July 1998, in the so-called Silhouette case,49 the ECJ found that a 
European Commission directive on trademarks mandates a com-
munity-only exhaustion rule, and thus EU member states are re-
quired to uphold the right of trademark owners to restrict parallel 
 
44. See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l Inc., 523 U.S. 135 
(1998). 
45. Linda Greenhouse, Ruling Aids ‘Gray Market’ in U.S. Goods, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 10, 1998, at D1.  For a more detailed description of the court’s ruling see: In-
ternational Trade Reporter, Vol. 15, No. 10, (March 11, 1998), pp. 415-416 
46. See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 152. 
47.  A better term in this case might be “regional exhaustion,” the point being 
that over the past several decades the individual nations of western Europe have 
been in process of  evolving into states of the European Union.  See ROTHNIE, supra 
note 33, chapters 6-7. 
48. See id. 
49. Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v. Harlauer Handelsge-
sellschaft mbH, Case C-355/96 
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imports.  Thus, the court stated emphatically: 
The Directive cannot be interpreted as leaving it open to the 
Member States to provide in their domestic law for exhaus-
tion of the rights conferred by a trade mark in respect of 
products put on the market in non-member countries . . . . 
[The purpose of the Directive is only] . . . to safeguard the 
function of the internal market.50 
While the case in point concerned trademarks, it is widely as-
sumed that the ruling would also apply to copyright and patent 
holders as well. 
In Japan, the situation is also in flux.  Japan took an ambivalent 
position during the TRIPS negotiations regarding international ex-
haustion.  This was because of conflicting decisions on the subject 
in Japanese courts (though the predominant opinion had favored 
national exhaustion and allowing restrictions).  In 1997, however, 
the Japanese Supreme Court, to the surprise of many, ruled in fa-
vor of parallel imports unless the patent holder had explicitly pro-
vided for exclusion of such imports through a contract. The key 
paragraph in the decision reads as follows: “The patentee is not 
permitted to enforce his patent right in Japan against . . . third par-
ties or subsequent purchasers . . . except where the patentee has 
agreed with the (first) purchaser (to exclude Japan from the territo-
ries for sale or use) . . . and has explicitly indicated the same on the 
patented product.”51  Though the court explicitly viewed this as a 
case of free trade vs. patent holder rights, it is not clear what stance 
the Japanese government will take on the issue in future WTO ne-
gotiations. 
 
50.  Id.; see also Allen Dixon, Covington and Burling, Silhouette Case,  
(Mimeo); Christopher Heath, Parallel Imports and International Trade,  CRESPI, 
Vol. 28, No. 5 (1997), pp. 623-32 (containing background on the situation in the EU 
— though with conclusions with which the authors disagree). 
51. Nanao Naoko et al., Decisions on Parallel Imports of Patented Goods,  36 
IDEA 567 (1996); Tadayoshi Homma, TRIPS and After—A Realist’s View,  13 
CHIBA J. L. & ECON. 2 (1998); see also, Heath, supra note 50; at 623-632. 
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One final point regarding the variety of national legal re-
sponses to the assertion of IPR owners of the authority to control 
parallel imports under a national exhaustion doctrine.  Courts in 
the United States and other countries have tied themselves in knots 
over the implications that result from the geographic location of 
both the manufacturer and the first sale of the good or service.  
Four potential scenarios are possible regarding reimportation: (1) 
the goods are manufactured in the United States and then first sold 
within the United States, then sold abroad and finally reimported 
into the United States; (2) the goods are manufactured in the 
United States but first sold abroad; (3) the goods are manufactured 
abroad and first sold abroad; and (4) the goods are manufactured 
abroad and first sold in the United States.  Though an extended 
analysis of the legal implications of each scenario is beyond the 
scope of this article, the authors would like to emphasize the that 
economic rationales adopted in this article would dictate that under 
all four scenarios the patent owner should be granted authority to 
block the imports (the only possible exception would involve af-
filiates reimporting after first sale). 
II. PHARMACEUTICALS: A SCIENCE-BASED INDUSTRY 
A.  The Economics of the Patent System 
1.  Economic Theory and the Patent System 
Though in earlier centuries, ‘natural law’ (justice for the inven-
tor) and ‘reward by monopoly theories’ were of great importance 
in giving legitimacy to the patent system, contemporary debates 
revolve entirely around economic issues.  Recent analysis of the 
economic assumptions behind patents begins with the seminal re-
search of Nobel Prize winner, Kenneth Arrow.  In 1962, Arrow, 
using a simple economic model, stated the case for the temporary 
grant of market power for patents and copyrights.52  He pointed out 
that inventions, like all forms of knowledge, were ‘free goods’ 
 
52. See Kenneth W. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources 
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITIES: ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL FACTORS, NBER, (1962).  For an excellent review of the economic lit-
erature on intellectual property see: Carlos A. Primo Braga, Guidance from Eco-
nomic Theory, in STRENGTHENING PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE (Wolfgang Siebeck, et al, 
eds. 1990). 
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(‘public goods’ in economists’ terms): that is, they can be used by 
more than one consumer without being reduced in quantity or qual-
ity (‘nonrivalrous’ in economists’ terms), and it is not easy to pre-
vent others from copying or using them without incurring the costs 
of development (‘nonexcludable’ in economists’ terms).  Thus, ab-
sent some special government intervention to overcome this mar-
ket failure,53 inventors would have little or no incentive to produce 
new technology and society would suffer from this suboptimal in-
vestment in knowledge.  The patent system is one means of attack-
ing this problem.  As Kenneth Dam has stated in a recent paper: 
[T]his problem—often called the “appropriability prob-
lem”—is that, if a firm could not recover the costs of inven-
tion because the resulting information were available to all, 
then we could expect a much lower and indeed suboptimal 
level of innovation.  In short, the patent system prevents 
others from reaping where they have not sown and thereby 
promotes [R&D] investment in innovation.  The patent law 
achieves this laudable end by creating property rights in in-
ventions.54 
There are two aspects of the patent system that have special 
relevance for pharmaceuticals: the degree to which the system ac-
tually grants real monopoly and whether patent races can reduce 
economic welfare.  We shall review these issues in the next two 
subsections. 
2. Patents and Monopoly 
There has been a great deal of discussion over the question of 
the degree to which the patent system in reality grants monopoly 
power to the inventor for long periods of time.  In economists’ 
terms, the patent allows the inventor to price well above marginal 
costs, i.e., the cost of producing an extra unit of output, for much 
of the full term of the patent and to reduce output below the opti-
mal level from society’s standpoint.  The result could be substan-
tial ‘dead weight loss,’ which occurs because the sale of a good at 
 
53. Market failure occurs when the freely determined price regulatory mecha-
nism fails to yield efficient outcomes. 
54. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 247 (1994). 
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greater than marginal cost limits the resources devoted to produc-
ing that good in that some consumers who would have been will-
ing to pay an amount equal to or greater than the marginal cost—
but below the monopoly sales price—are prevented from buying 
the good.55 
In general, even economists with other doubts about the impact 
of the patent system, concede that patents do not confer such 
power in most cases.  As Scherer has reported: “[s]tatistical studies 
suggest that the vast majority of all patents confer very little mo-
nopoly power.”56  The reasons for this reality are various. First, 
while there are a few patents which may be truly unique, in most 
cases there are a number of competing products and processes.  
Also, as research has shown, even older, inferior products often 
continue to compete effectively with the newly patented products. 
For instance, in pharmaceuticals, the drug Recombinate (to treat 
hemophilia) was released in 1995; one year later, the drug Ko-
genate was introduced to treat the same symptoms.  Similarly, the 
protease inhibitor for HIV/AIDS Invirase, introduced in 1995, was 
followed 3 months later by the protease inhibitor Norvir.57  As 
shown below, brand name and consumer loyalty offset the effects 
of patent innovation.  In these cases, then, the ability of the inven-
tor to price his good for above marginal costs for a long period is 
much circumscribed. 
Second, because patents must disclose significant information 
about the underlying technology and because information by its 
nature is difficult to monitor, there will be substantial spillover; 
and even with legal protection, imitation is likely to come quickly 
in many cases.  One study found that about 60 percent of success-
fully patented inventions in the pharmaceutical, chemistry, elec-
tronics and machine industry were imitated within four years at an 
 
55. See Erick Kaufer, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 18ff, (1989); 
Alden F. Abbott, Developing a Framework for Intellectual Property Protection to 
Advance Innovation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY 
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 318-22 (Francis W. Cushing and Carole Ganz Brown 
eds., 1990). 
56. F.M. Scherer,  The Value of Patents and Other Legally Protected Commer-
cial Rights: Panel Discussion, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 535, 547 (1985). 
57. See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturing Association (PhRMA), 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE: 1999 59 (1999). 
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average cost of less than two-thirds the original cost.58  Another 
study of 100 U.S. firms found that information concerning devel-
opment decisions was generally in the hands of competitors within 
12 to 18 months of issuance; and information  concerning the de-
tailed nature and operation of the new product leaked within a 
year. For this article, it is of note that for pharmaceuticals, in 57 
percent of the sampled cases detailed information about new drug 
products was generally in the hands of competitors within six 
months of issuance.59 
Finally, as Kenneth Dam has pointed out, features of a nation’s 
regulatory and legal systems operate to limit the force of the mo-
nopoly.  These include limitation on the duration of the patent, in-
cluding, in the case of pharmaceuticals, substantial periods devoted 
to testing in the regulatory process; limitations on the breadth or 
scope of a patent; and finally, vigorous use of  the judicial system 
to ferret out patent “misuse,” or going beyond the bounds of the 
patent grant.60 
All of this has led some economists to argue that patents are no 
different than other forms of private property rights.  As Meiners 
and Staaf state: 
It is curious that almost everyone refers to a patent as a 
monopoly.  Many textbooks refer to patents as the classic 
monopoly.  Why are patents not considered like any other 
exclusive private property right?  All private property rights 
exclude and thus have a monopoly element.  Contracts cre-
ate rights that are exclusive and thus have monopoly ele-
ments.  Individuals have exclusive rights in their labor and 
real property.  Exclusive rights create the same incentives 
that patent rights create by encouraging investments in 
goods and services.61 
3. Too Much of a Good Thing? 
 
58. See Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical 
Study, 91 ECON. J. 907, 909, 913 (1981). 
59. See Edwin Mansfield, How Rapidly Does Technology Leak Out? 34 J.  
INDUS. ECON. 217, tbl. III (1985). 
60. See Dam, supra note 54, at 247. 
61. Roger E. Meiners and Robert J. Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-
marks: Property or Monopoly?  13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 911, 915 (1990). 
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As we shall describe below, recent research has demonstrated a 
“burst of innovation” in the United States, evidenced by the huge 
increase in applications for patents in the last decade.  While this 
burst of activity was experienced across a number of industrial sec-
tors, biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms together represented 
a large element within the surge. A recent paper by Samuel Kor-
tum and Josh Lerner calculated that in the decade between the 
early 1980s and the early 1990s, annual patent applications where 
the first-named inventor is a U.S. resident for biotechnology firms 
more than doubled, from about 1500 in the 1980s to over 3000 in 
the early 1990s.62  This leads to the question of whether these pat-
ent races are producing “too much of a good thing.” 
The possibility of too much competition to produce patents has 
led some economists to suggest and model situations where the 
patent system will potentially reduce economic welfare through 
wasteful overinvestment in R&D to win a patent race.  In a path-
breaking article in 1968, Yoram Barzel demonstrated that compe-
tition in the prepatent stage, in certain cases, would lead not only to 
overinvestment but also to a situation where the innovation would 
be introduced sooner than would be socially optimal (without go-
ing into technical details, the model focused on the fact that for 
every innovation there is an optimal introduction time in terms of 
the maximization of present value).63  Barzel’s article was fol-
lowed by a cottage industry of economic analyses, which com-
bined industrial organization principles with R&D patterns and 
game theory and applied these new tools to the patent system. 
As examples, Dasgupta and Stiglitz showed that under certain 
plausible conditions, where demand for an innovation was inelastic 
and there is free entry into an industry, the result “may be exces-
sive duplication of research effort . . . [and] industry-wide R&D 
expenditures [will] exceed[] the socially optimal level.”64  In sev-
 
62. See Samuel Kortum and Josh Lerner, Stronger Protection or Technological 
Revolution: What is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting?  NBER WORKING 
PAPER, NO. 6204, (September 1997), p. 22 and Figure 10. 
63. See Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON.& STAT. 
348 (1968) 
64. Partha Dasgupta and Joseph Stiglitz, Industrial Structure and The Nature 
Innovative Activity, 90 ECON. J. 266, 289 (1980); see also M. KAMIEN AND N. 
SCHWARTZ, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION, 105-12 (1982). 
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eral other articles, Pankaj Tandon also modeled situations where 
excessive R&D competition produced socially inefficient out-
comes.65 
In parallel with these negative assessments, and growing in 
force in recent years, is a stream of literature that takes a different 
view of the consequences of R&D patent rivalry.  These scholars 
focus on the broader connections between the evolution of basic 
scientific knowledge and the pace and direction of invention and 
innovation, which is partially governed by the pursuit of  private 
gains through intellectual property. 
In a 1984 contribution, Burstein asserted that for knowledge-
based products, which must be “sold bundled with education and 
other complementary assets,” the amount and intensity of knowl-
edge diffusion will be directly related to intellectual property con-
cerns.  He argued, “that there is more reason to be concerned about 
too paltry grants of property rights in knowledge-based products 
than with the magnitude of quasi-rents to innovation.”66 
More recently, Richard Nelson and Robert Merges, writing to-
gether and separately, also point out that the other side of patent 
races are potentially large additions to the common pool of public 
knowledge.  They note that technological developments tend to 
proceed much more vigorously under a regime where there are 
many rivalrous sources of invention, though competitive invest-
ments may result in inefficiencies.67  It is this insight which drives 
their “first to invent” patent theory in which the motto, as they say, 
remains “faster is better.”  Work by another Nelson co-author, Sid-
ney Winter, reinforces this view by showing that “unimpeded imi-
tation need not yield inferior results.68 
 
65. See Pankaj Tandon, Rivalry and Excessive Allocation of Resources to Re-
search, 14 BELL J. ECON. 152,165 (1983); see also Richard J. Gilbert and David 
M.G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly,  72 AM. 
ECON. REV. 514 (1982).  See also, Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Pat-
ent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803 (1998). 
66. M.L. Burstein,  Innovation and Property Rights,  22 ECON. INQUIRY 608 
(1984). 
67. See e.g.,  Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Econom-
ics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990). 
68. See Sidney Winter, Patents in Complex Contexts: Incentives and Effective-
ness, in OWNING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION: VALUE AND ETHICAL 
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Finally, Scherer, an agnostic about the welfare implications of 
many aspects of the patent system, states the following concerning 
R&D and patent races: 
 
When the success of any single project is uncertain, run-
ning duplicated projects hastens success unless the rivals 
conduct exactly identical experiments, which is unlikely.  
The greater the social gains from a successful innovation, 
the larger is the optimal number of parallel but uncertain 
approaches. 
. . . [A]ny single firm (that is, monopolist) . . . is likely to 
have perceptual blind spots . . . .  By propagating a greater 
diversity of approaches, competition often evokes a win-
ning solution at lower cost despite seemingly inefficient 
duplication.69 
B.  PHARMACEUTICALS: A SCIENCE-BASED INDUSTRY 
1.  The Burgeoning Patent System 
The increasing importance of the patent system to U.S. 
knowledge-based industries is dramatically illustrated by the huge 
increase in applications for patents by U.S. inventors over the past 
decade.  Applications for patents have risen more since 1985 than 
in any other decade this century.  From 1900 to the mid-1980s, 
applications fluctuated between 40 and 80 thousand per year.  
Between 1985 and 1995, a steep rise occurred in annual 
applications; in 1995 over 120,000 applications were received by 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).70 
 
Recent research has uncovered a number of striking facts and 
causes behind the surge.  First, it represents a “real burst of 
innovation” in the United States and “changes in the management 
 
ISSUES 41, 43 (Vivian Weil and John W. Snapper eds., 1989). 
69. F.M. SCHERER AND DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 644 (1990). 
70. See Kortum and Lerner, supra note 62, fig. 1. 
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of innovation” which result from a significant move toward 
capturing the rewards of innovation through the patent system.  
Second, though the burst of activity was experienced broadly 
across a number of sectors, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals 
taken together represented a large element within the surge.  Third, 
the globalization of technology and the desire of firms to achieve 
competitive advantage in foreign markets was illustrated by 
simultaneous surge in U.S. patenting abroad, which tracked the 
large increase in U.S. domestic patenting activity.71 
By all standard measures, the pharmaceutical industry is the 
most science-based  of all U.S. industries.  In 1999, U.S. and for-
eign owned pharmaceutical companies are projected to invest over 
$20 billion in the United States; and in addition, U.S. firms will 
spend about $4 billion abroad.  Research-based pharmaceutical 
companies have more than doubled their R&D expenditures since 
1990, and in 1999 more than 20 percent of total sales will be de-
voted to R&D.  This places pharmaceuticals at the very top of the 
technology scale, ahead—in terms of R&D investment—of other 
high-tech industries such as electronics, aerospace and office 
equipment (including computers).72 
Though the amount of R&D invested is an important determi-
nant of technological advance and competitiveness, the productiv-
ity of that investment also must be factored in.  For the U.S. phar-
maceutical industry, the combined results of huge R&D 
investments and efficient research management has clearly paid 
off: a recent study of the country of origin of 265 drugs that spread 
to major markets worldwide between 1970 and 1992 showed U.S. 
domination, with 118 U.S.-based origins—more than the combined 
total of the next four competing nations (Japan, the U.K., Germany 
and Switzerland).73  Further, in the early 1990s, U.S. pharmaceuti-
cal companies held patents for 92 of the 100 most commonly pre-
scribed drugs in the United States.74 
2. Drug Innovation: Time, Cost Risk 
 
71. See id. at 32-33. 
72. See PhRMA, supra note 57, ch. 2. 
73. See Heinz Redwood, New Drugs in the World Market: Incentives and Im-
pediments to Innovation, AM. ENTERPRISE, Aug. 1993, at 72. 
74. See SCHWEITZER, supra note 29, at 21. 
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Drug innovation is an expensive, high-risk and lengthy process.  
From applied research to commercialization, the development of 
new drugs takes on average eight to nine years; and adding in time 
spent on earlier fundamental research, the time may extend over 
fifteen or twenty years. 
Over the past two decades, there have been numerous studies 
of the costs of drug development.  These studies have all under-
scored two basic facts: that drug development costs are large and 
have grown in real terms over the period.  Studying an earlier pe-
riod, Gambardella estimates that in real terms (using 1986 dollars) 
individual drug development costs rose from $97 to $200 million 
between 1986 and 1990.75  A more recent study by the Boston 
Consulting Group placed the costs of developing a drug in 1990 at 
$500 million (1993 dollars) before taxes, including the direct costs 
of research, the costs of research failures and the interest costs over 
the entire period to commercialization.76 
Finally, drug development is a high-risk process.  For instance, 
recent studies have shown that about only one in 65,000 com-
pounds synthesized by pharmaceutical laboratories are successful, 
if success is measured in terms of global sales exceeding $100 mil-
lion annually;77 a second study indicated that only 1 out of 5000 
compounds synthesized during clinical trials eventually reached 
the market.78  Further, other research has concluded that only three 
out of ten drugs that are brought to market cover development 
costs after taxes.79  The same study showed that 20 percent of the 
products with the highest revenues generated 70 percent of the 
 
75. See ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA, SCIENCE AND INNOVATION: THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN THE 1980S 169, n. 2, (1995). 
76. See BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, THE CONTRIBUTION OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES: WHAT’S AT STAKE FOR AMERICA (1993); for other 
cost estimates, see also CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS, RISKS AND REWARDS, 1-37 (1994), 
and J.A. DiMasi, et al., The Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 10 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 107 (1991). 
77. See HEINZ REDWOOD, THE PRICE OF HEALTH 25 (1989). 
78. See R.S. Halliday, et al., R&D Philosophy and Management in the World’s 
Leading Pharmaceutical Companies, 1992 J. PHARMACEUTICAL MED. 139-154. 
79. See H.G. Grabowski and J.M. Vernon, A New Look at the Return and Risks 
to Pharmaceutical R&D,  MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, Vol. 37, No. 7, (1990), pp. 804-
821. 
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profits during the period under scrutiny (1980-1984).  Similar re-
sults were found by Scherer, who in another study estimated that 
55 percent of industry profits came from about ten percent of the 
drugs.80 
 
3. Drug Discovery and the Revolution in Molecular Biology 
In order to understand the special importance of intellectual 
property rights for the pharmaceutical industry—particularly for 
small biotechnology firms—it is necessary to review the revolu-
tionary changes which have taken place in the pharmaceutical in-
novation process over the past two decades.  Oversimplifying 
somewhat, it can be said that behind this revolution were major 
changes and advances in the biological sciences, highlighted by the 
dramatic breakthrough in genetics and genetic engineering, but 
also including increased knowledge in the fields of molecular and 
cell biology, peptide chemistry, and physiology, among others; the 
rise of ‘discovery by design,’ based upon computer-aided design 
experiments which hugely increased the potential for screening 
thousands of drugs; and advances in other experimental technolo-
gies and instruments, such as X-ray crystallography and nuclear 
magnetic resonance which greatly enhanced the analysis of protein 
structures and both complemented and underpinned computer de-
sign experiments.81 
The revolution in genetic and molecular biology actually began 
forty years ago, with Watson and Crick’s discovery of the double 
helix structure of DNA.82  But the key technological advance came 
in the early 1980s with the Cohen-Boyer patent for a method of  
manipulating cell genetics so that the cell could produce a specific 
protein.  Previously, proteins, which consist of long chains of 
amino acids, were too large and complex to be synthesized in 
commercial quantities through traditional fermentation methods.  
The Cohen-Boyer invention allowed the production of large quan-
tities of individual proteins and because there are approximately 
 
80. See F.M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1993, at 97. 
81. See GAMBARDELLA, supra note 75, at 21. 
82. See RICHARD V. KOWLES, GENETICS, SOCIETY, & DECISIONS 22 (1985). 
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500,000 different human proteins, each with a specific function, 
this vastly increased the potential for new drug discovery. The 
Human Genome Project, a global initiative to map and sequence 
the whole human genome, is slated to be completed by 2003.83  At 
the present time, about 500 genes have been targeted for drug in-
tervention to alter gene activity to achieve desired health outcomes 
(eradicate infection, for instance).  When the project is complete, it 
is estimated that an additional 3,000 to 10,000 genes will be tar-
geted.84 
The scientific advances identified with the molecular revolu-
tion (in genetics and molecular biology) have produced “two rela-
tively distinct technical trajectories” and two distinct industry sub-
sectors.85  The first, which is identified in the public mind as 
biotechnology, uses genetic engineering to manufacture proteins—
that is, large molecules—in quantities large enough to treat bio-
logical disfunctions.  The second trajectory (the equivalent of what 
Gambardella labels “discovery by design”86) uses recent advances 
in genetics and molecular biology to more efficiently “manufac-
ture” conventional small molecule synthetic drugs. 
Discovery by design techniques have made it possible for in-
cumbent firms to utilize economies of scale and continue to domi-
nate many areas of pharmaceutical research and product develop-
ment.  Successful incumbent drug companies increasingly organize 
their discovery process around teams of talented scientists with a 
broad array of knowledge in such disciplines as molecular biology, 
genetics, and peptide chemistry.  These scientists not only take the 
lead in creating new science for product development within the 
firm, but also—of equal importance—keep the firm abreast of the 
latest developments in public science, i.e., increase the firm’s “ab-
 
83. The US. Department of Energy and The National Institutes of Health, U.S. 
Human Genome Project 5-Year Research Goals: 1998 – 2003 (last modified Nov. 
15, 1999) <http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human_Genome/hg5yp>. 
84. See PhRMA, supra note 57, at 8-9. 
85. See Rebecca Henderson et al., The Pharmaceutical Industry and the Revo-
lution in Melecular Biology: Exploring the Interactions Between Scientific, Institu-
tional and Organizational Change, DRAFT FOR CCC MATRIX CONFERENCE, (Brew-
ster, MA, September, 1996), p. 13. 
86. See GAMBARDELLA, supra note 75, at 21. 
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sorptive capacity.”87  As Rosenberg has stated, in-house research is 




In biotechnology and the production of large-scale molecules 
through exploitation of the techniques of genetic engineering as a 
production tool, small, new entrant firms have taken the lead.  Dur-
ing the 1980s, entry rates in this area rose steeply and continued 
the rate of increase into the 1990s.  By the end of 1992, there were 
almost 50 small, publicly trade biotechnology companies; and it is 
estimated that several times that number exist as privately held en-
tities.89  Most came into being as university spin-offs, backed by 
venture capitalists. 
What has emerged is a division of labor between this growing 
number of small firms and larger incumbents.  As  Kenneth Arrow 
suggested in 1983, because of greater flexibility and less informa-
tion loss across the organization, small firms potentially can make 
closer to optimal investments in riskier projects. 90  This seems to 
be occurring in the discovery and production of biotechnology-
based proteins.  (As described above, however, this does not mean 
that in certain areas incumbent firms are not maintaining, indeed 
increasing, their investments in research.) 
In the field of biotechnology, incumbents play a key collabora-
tive role through R&D contracts, joint ventures, and even venture 
capital investment.  Large firms have large organizational capaci-
ties, which allows them to undertake systemic product develop-
ment, including clinical testing and commercialization.  They face 
lower capital costs and can spread uncertainty across a large num-
ber of activities. 
 
87. Wesley M. Cohen and Daniel A. Levinthal, Absorptive Capacity: A New 
Perspective on Learning and Innovation, ADMIN. SCI. Q., Mar. 1990, at 128. 
88. N. Rosenberg, Why Do Firms Do Basic Research?  19 RESEARCH POLICY 
165-174. 
89. See Henderson et al., supra note 85, at 24. 
90. See Kenneth Arrow, Innovation in Large and Small Firms, in, 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP (J. Ronen ed., 1983). 
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Small firms invest in new drug development, with the knowl-
edge that there is a market for their product and that large firms 
will take over the responsibility of  shepherding the drug through 
clinical trials, regulatory approval and marketing.  Arrow correctly 
predicted the process thusly: 
The existence of markets for research outcomes . . . alters 
the incentives for research within large firms . . . .  For now 
the [large] firm has an alternative supply of research out-
comes on which to base its development of innova-
tions . . . .  If this analysis is meaningful, it suggests a divi-
sion of labor according to firm size.  Smaller firms will 
tend to specialize more in the research phase and in smaller 
development processes; larger firms will devote a much 
smaller proportion of their R&D budget to the research 
phase.91 
For this article, there is another central condition that is crucial 
to the successful, economically efficient division of labor de-
scribed by Arrow: that is the existence of strong intellectual prop-
erty rights, particularly for the small research firms.  Gambardella 
describes the relevance of IP rights to the division of labor: 
the knowledge-base for drug discovery has become more 
‘divisible.’  With suitable contracts and intellectual prop-
erty rights, relevant ‘fragments’ of knowledge can be ex-
changed by specialized agents . . .[Small firms], which 
have a natural advantage in producing ideas, realize that, 
with ‘divisibility’ of science, they can invest in discovery, 
and sell their research outputs to larger firms.  Patents and 
intellectual property rights will be very important to sustain 




C.  How Important Is the Patent System for Innovation in the 
Research-Based Pharmaceutical Industry? 
 
91. Id. 
92. GAMBARDELLA, supra note 75, at 79. 
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1. Patents—A Vital Link to Pharmaceutical Research and De-
velopment 
Ideally, the patent system would be tailored to individual prod-
ucts or, at least, sectors because the appropriate balance of incen-
tives (through length and scope of patent, for instance) is based 
upon numerous individual market characteristics such as demand, 
costs of R&D, spillover effects and market structure, among oth-
ers.93  Because the information necessary to fine tune the patent 
system to fit the demand and technology benefits produced by each 
invention—or even large classes of inventions—is often unobtain-
able, national, and now international, patent systems have settled 
on a consensus of twenty years, though national systems still differ 
widely in interpreting patent scope, misuse and antitrust bounda-
ries. 
Research over the past several decades has also established that 
industrial sectors vary widely in their dependence on, and use of, 
the patent system as a means of preventing imitation or for royalty 
income.  In one of the most widely cited studies, Levin et al. que-
ried 650 U.S. R&D executives to evaluate the effectiveness of pat-
ents versus other methods of appropriating private returns such as 
secrecy, moving quickly down the learning curve, first mover ad-
vantage and superior sales and service.  Averaging across 130 in-
dustries, for both products and processes, nonpatent strategies such 
as secrecy and first-mover advantage were found to be substan-
tially more important than patent protection.  In only 25 of the 130 
industries, did patents as a means of preventing imitation exceed 5 
on a 7-point scale (moderate to very effective range).  Signifi-
cantly, however, pharmaceuticals are placed right at the top of the 
scale for patent dependence.94 
In 1985, another survey asked chief R&D executives of 100 
U.S. firms what proportion of the inventions they developed be-
 
93. See PAUL STONEMAN, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
106 (1987). 
94. See Richard Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Re-
search and Development, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, No. 3, 783 
(1987).  An earlier study by two British economists had produced similar results. See 
C.T. TAYLOR AND Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT 
SYSTEM, (1973). 
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tween 1981 and 1983 would not have been developed without pat-
ent protection.  Pharmaceuticals, once again, displayed strong de-
pendence on patent protection, with the pharmaceutical executives 
claiming that 60 percent of their drugs would not have been devel-
oped without patents, versus only 17 percent for the machinery in-
dustry, 12 percent for fabricated products, and 11 percent for elec-
trical equipment.  Further, the industry stated that 65 percent of the 
drugs would not have been commercially introduced without pro-
tection.  The study also found that 82 percent of patentable drugs 
were indeed patented, as were over 50 percent in most other indus-
tries.  Finally, the study demonstrated that, contrary to some re-
ports, firms in most industries had about as much propensity to 
patent as they had in the mid-l960s—with the propensity in the 
1980s rising somewhat for pharmaceuticals over the previous pe-
riod.95 
Two reasons have been advanced for the significant importance 
attached to patents by the pharmaceutical industry.  First, pharma-
ceutical companies can obtain unusually ‘strong’ patents because 
pharmaceutical innovations take well-defined forms, i.e., new 
compounds, which can be described easily and in detail.  Con-
versely, a second reason stems from the negative implications of 
the first: that is, that well-defined compounds are easily copied, 
and pharmaceutical firms must quickly move to defend their new 
discoveries with intellectual property protection.96 
2.  Intellectual Property and Economic Development 
Over the past few years, and particularly after the TRIPS be-
came a reality, interest in the connection between intellectual prop-
erty, FDI and trade burgeoned—especially the implications for de-
veloping economies.  Earlier literature on the impact of intellectual 
property on developing countries had been strongly negative.97  
More recently, a much more complex picture has emerged, and at 
this point a number of studies have posited large potential benefits 
from effective intellectual property rules for the world trading sys-
 
95. See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, February 1986, at 175. 
96. See GAMBARDELLA, supra note 75, at 44. 
97. See E. Penrose, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 
220 (1973). 
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tem as a whole, as well as for developing economies.  Developing 
country regimes have themselves reacted to the changing percep-
tion of the role of intellectual property: since 1987, over 40 devel-
oping countries unilaterally have strengthened intellectual property 
laws (although in some cases, it should be admitted external pres-
sure from the U.S. and the EU played a role).98 
 
In light of this more complex, evolving picture of the relation-
ship between effective IPR protection and economic development, 
Abbott’s arguments against parallel imports restrictions—and by 
implication strong IPRs—seems a throwback to the “dependency” 
theories of earlier decades.  In conceding that by and large parallel 
imports have been blocked in most countries during the postwar 
decades, Abbott goes on to argue that during that period “develop-
ing countries have not made the kind of economic progress that 
would be desirable,” a circumstance which he attributes to restric-
tions on parallel imports.  He later concludes specifically: “Restric-
tions on parallel imports are likely to constrain the export opportu-
nities of producers established in developing countries, and to limit 
capital formation and economic growth in those countries.”99 
Abbott’s conjectures fly in the face of overwhelming evidence 
that many developing countries, particularly in East Asia and more 
recently in South America, posted huge economic growth rates 
throughout the past four decades.  Their level of economic devel-
opment and per capita GDP have steadily converged with devel-
oped economies in the West. 
In general, available data tend to support the view that, over 
time, both world economic welfare and the welfare of developing 
countries, will benefit by a more effective worldwide IPR system, 
including restrictions on parallel imports.  Two caveats must be 
added, however: (1) direct evidence is difficult to come by because 
of the indirect and subtle ways IPRs operate and because of scat-
tered data on IPR transactions; and (2) it is clear that an effective 
 
98. See Keith E. Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in Asia: 
Implications for Australia, 46th Joseph Fisher Lecture, University of Adelaide, (No-
vember 19, 1997) [Hereinafter Maskus, George Fisher Lecture]. 
99. Abbott, Discussion Paper, supra note 19, at 8, 17. 
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IPR regime is only one prerequisite for strong economic growth in 
developing economies.  Usually, the decision to put in place a 
strong IPR system is accompanied by other important policy and 
structural changes, including sound macroeconomic policies, in-
vestment in education and skilled labor, and trade and investment 
liberalization—all attributes of economies which are building solid 
technological assets and capabilities. 
That stated, this section attempts to distill some of the major 
conclusions from recent studies of the connection between strong 
national intellectual systems and FDI, trade and technological de-
velopment.  Regarding FDI, several fundamental facts should be 
established first.  Multinational firms have a choice, obviously, 
whether to export to a host country or to invest (possibly also 
through licensing) in the country.  The decision will be based on a 
number of factors, including: capacity of the host country to absorb 
the technology; input prices across nations; transport costs; politi-
cal and economic stability and import protection laws; and level 
and skill of both labor and management. 
Recent research has also revealed a common development pat-
tern for inward direct investment.  The least developed countries, 
with little supportive infrastructure and with low levels of educa-
tion, skills and productivity attract little or no FDI.  As some coun-
tries have moved up the technological and economic scale—by 
improving education, skills, infrastructure and government effi-
ciency—they have gradually become attractive locations for FDI, 
particularly for intrafirm vertical operations such as labor-intensive 
assembly.  Over time, some countries achieve income and techno-
logical levels that allow them also to become attractive locations 
for producing differentiated consumer and capital goods; and hori-
zontal investment (and trade) replaces vertical investment (and 
trade) as the dominant connection with MNEs. 
Because of this progression and because of special characteris-
tics of the pharmaceutical industry, that sector is especially charac-
terized by larger numbers of affiliates operating licensing arrange-
ments.  Indeed, pharmaceuticals tops the list of foreign affiliates 
per U.S. parent, with 33.8 affiliates per firm.100  Pharmaceuticals 
 
100. See Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encour-
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(as part of the overall chemicals group) also have a strong presence 
in emerging markets—particularly in Latin America and China.101 
 
3.  Current Views on the Impact of Effective Patent Protection 
on Developing Economies 
There is a growing consensus that countries with stronger IPRs 
attract a good deal more FDI than countries without such systems.  
Edwin Mansfield surveyed 100 firms in six major industries, re-
garding the importance of IPRs (in this case patents) in their in-
vestment location and licensing decisions, broken down by type of 
investment facility (sales, assembly and basic production, compo-
nents, complete manufacturing and R&D facilities).  The result 
was that the higher the type of activity (sales vs. research) the 
greater the concern for patent protection.  All sectors showed con-
siderable negative reaction to the lack of strong IPR when locating 
R&D facilities, and most also would be much less inclined to lo-
cate full production facilities in such economies.  Of particular 
note for this article, the chemicals industry (including pharmaceu-
ticals) demonstrated strong concerns for all production stages, in-
cluding 87 and 100 percent of the firms, respectively, for full pro-
duction and R&D facilities.102  In a follow-up paper, Mansfield 
found the same overall numbers in Japanese and German firms 
considering FDI.103 
Mansfield and Lee extended this survey research in 1996 with 
a study comparing the volume of U.S. direct investment in a se-
lected group of countries against perceived weaknesses in IPR pro-
tection (they corrected for market size, degree of industrialization, 
measure of openness, among other things).  They found that weak-
ness of IPR had a significant negative impact on the location of 
U.S. FDI—and once again, this result was strongest in the chemi-
 
aging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 109, 118 (1998). 
101. See id. at 117-18. 
102. See Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Direct Investment 
and Technology Transfer,  INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, (WORLD BANK) 
DISCUSSION PAPER 19 (1995). 
103. See id. at 27. 
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cal (pharmaceutical) industry.104  Maskus et al., extended this re-
search with a more comprehensive study that factored in multiple 
investment modes and opportunities exploited by MNEs and ana-
lyzed the results in terms of patent strength.  They found that pat-
ent strength is strongly and positively connected with FDI, as 
measured by asset stock.105  This coincides with findings in an ear-
lier paper, where Maskus and Penubarti had also shown empiri-
cally that (1) stronger patent protection produced greater bilateral 
trade flows (data from 77 countries and 24 industrial sectors); and 
(2) exporting firm discriminate on the basis of local patent protec-
tion in their sales decisions, with stronger protection resulting in 
larger export flows.106 
Utilizing a different econometric model, Braga and Fink con-
firmed the basic conclusions of Maskus et al. that patent protection 
did increase trade flows between developed and developing coun-
tries and that this was particular evident for larger developing 
countries.107  In 1997, Smith also confirmed empirically that weak 
patent rights pose a trade barrier to U.S. exports in developing 
countries because of the threat of imitation by U.S. firms.108  Fi-
nally, as noted above, Gould and Gruben performed regressions 
using as variables, patent protection and openness to trade and 
country-specific characteristics.  Their results showed that patent 
protection was an important determinant of economic growth, es-
 
104. See Jeong-Yeon Lee and Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protec-
tion and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 181-86 (1996). 
105. See Keith E. Maskus et al., Patents, Trade, and Foreign Direct Investment, 
(1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with University of Colorado). 
106. See Keith E. Maskus and Mohan Penubarti, How Trade-Related are Intel-
lectual Property Rights? 39 J. INT’L ECON. 227, 248 (1995). Maskus and Penubarti 
point out that strengthening IPRs can potentially have two quite different effects on 
trade flows because trade is simultaneously increased through  market expansion  
effects and decreased through  market power  effects.  For most cases, they conclude 
that the  market expansions  effects prevail. 
107. See Carlos A. Primo Braga and Carsten Fink, The Economic Justifications 
for the Grant of Intellectual Property Rights:Patterns of Convergence and Conflict, 
in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION, 99 (Frederick M. 
Abbott and David J. Gerber eds., 1997). 
108. See E.J. Smith, Are Weak Patent Rights a Barrier to U.S. Exports?, De-
partment of Economics, University of Delaware, (mimeo 1997). Smith’s conclusions 
did not hold for very poor developing countries which posed little threat of imitation. 
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pecially when combined with relatively liberal trade regimes.109 
Technology transfer through joint ventures and licensing also 
works to improve the economic performance of developing coun-
tries.  License and FDI provide access both to technology and to 
the managerial assets of MNEs.  This is accomplished through a 
variety of means, including information in patents, activity aimed 
at “inventing around” existing patents and adoption of more ad-
vanced production inputs to reduce and refine overall production 
costs.  Patents, even though they do result in rents to developed 
country producers, through enforced disclosure also pave the way 
for significant technology transfer.110  As one study noted: “Since 
patents are clearly defined, they allow the technical and territorial 
scope of any technology transfer transaction to be precisely de-
fined.”111  Finally, an OECD survey of over 100 manufacturing ex-
ecutives demonstrated the negative consequences of weak IPR on 
technology transfer.  These executives listed lack of IPR protection 
as the most significant deterrent to licensing in developing coun-
tries.112 
The two most recent surveys of recent economic literature both 
conclude that, on balance, the new TRIPS Agreement and stronger 
IPR regimes in developing countries will, under many circum-
stances, have positive welfare benefits for world trade and for the 
individual countries.  Braga et al. state: “there is mounting evi-
dence that IPRs are indeed ‘trade-related.’  These results . . . sug-
gest that the implementation of  TRIPS will have a net trade creat-
ing impact.  Although no precise welfare predictions can be 
derived from them, they suggest that TRIPS may have a positive 
 
109. See David M. Gould and William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual 
Property Rights in Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV. ECON.  323 (1996). 
110. See Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum, Trade in Ideas: Patenting and 
Productivity in the OECD, 40 J. INT’L ECON. 251 (1996). 
111. H. Ullrich, The Importance of Industrial Property Law and Other Legal 
Measures in the Promotion of Technological Innovation,  INDUS. PROP., , 111 
(1989). 
112. See Claudio R. Frischtak, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
and Industrial Technology Development in Brazil, in, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARISONS 61, 80-81 (Francis W. Rushing and Carole Ganz Brown eds., 1990). 
GROOMBRIDGE.TYPMOCK.DOC 10/3/2006  1:33 PM 
222 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 10 :185 
allocation impact at the global level.”113 
Maskus reaches the same conclusion regarding IPR and FDI 
but places IPR within the context of other important policy initia-
tives that also influence FDI, namely technology transfer and en-
hanced economic growth.  He writes: 
While there is evidence that strengthening IPRs can be an 
effective means of inducing additional inward FDI, it is 
only one component among a broad set of important fac-
tors.  Emerging economies must recognize the strong com-
plementary relationships among IPRs, market liberalization 
and deregulation, technology development policies, and 
competition regimes.114 
And, as Maskus continues, regarding the special place of  IPRs 
in fostering  innovation  and technology diffusion in pharmaceuti-
cals: 
Surveys indicate that patents are important inducements to 
inventive activity in some sectors, including pharmaceuti-
cals, chemicals, instruments. . . .  Patents or related devices 
also matter in plant varieties and basic biotechnological in-
ventions.  In these sectors, the TRIPS Agreement should 
promote technology development and have the further 
benefit of inducing additional research into the product and 
technical needs of developing countries, including tropical 
medicine.115 
While the above studies do not analyze the impact of allowing 
parallel imports directly, there are strong, negative connections, 
identified thusly in one recent paper: 
With parallel imports, developing countries are likely to lose in 
two important ways: (1) where developing countries might initially 
have relatively low prices, parallel trade would result in diversion 
of supply away from the local market, pushing prices higher . . . 
and (2) to the extent that international exhaustion threatens parallel 
 
113. Primo Braga et al., supra note 13, at 113. 
114. Maskus, Role of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 100, at 152. 
115. Maskus, The International Regulation of Intellectual Property, supra note 
3, at 200. 
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exports from low priced developing countries, patent holders will 
be less likely to transfer technology and production capacity to 
them through direct investment and licensing.116 
 
V.  THE PHARMACEUTICAL DISTRIBUTION & MARKETING 
SYSTEM: A KEY TO INNOVATION AND PROTECTING HEALTH AND 
SAFETY 
A.  The Role of Territorial Vertical Restraints 
1.  Overview of the Debate 
The previous section discussed the role that a strong patent sys-
tem plays in promoting innovation in the research-based pharma-
ceutical industry.  This section analyzes the crucial role that the 
distribution system plays in supporting a strong patent system.  
Strong patent protection is of little benefit if pharmaceutical com-
panies are unable to distribute their product effectively and safely 
to market.  To the extent that parallel trade undermines this distri-
bution system, it has the potential to inflict damage on the pharma-
ceutical industry and consumers.  To be sure, it is important to note 
at the outset that the distribution chain in the pharmaceutical indus-
try is complex and varies significantly by country.  This is due in 
large part to the myriad of government regulations to which the in-
dustry is subject.117 
A common feature of the pharmaceutical distribution system is 
that the manufacturers and producers will sign contracts with au-
thorized distributors within a defined geographic region.  These 
limits on geographic distribution (and marketing) are referred to as 
territorial arrangements, restrictions or restraints.  Such territorial 
limitations are but one form of ‘vertical’ arrangement (also re-
 
116. Bale, supra note 41, at 648. 
117. There is little disagreement that this stems from the multifaceted health 
regulatory policies throughout the world to which the pharmaceutical industry is 
subject. For example, some countries, usually in the developing world, have a mo-
nopsonystic system, whereby one entity (usually state-owned and regulated) pur-
chases and distributes the pharmaceutical product.  Other countries rely on different 
licensing practices, whereby particular distributors are licensed to sell the pharma-
ceutical product.  For an excellent review of these different end-stage distribution 
practices, see DANZON, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULATION, supra note 28, ch. 3. 
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ferred to as restraints and restrictions),118 which are contractual 
limitations imposed by a firm on one stage of production or the 
distribution process upon a firm at a different stage.119  While ver-
tical allocation of primary distribution territories can take a variety 
of forms, they all have in common the goal of limiting the location 
in which a distributor can sell a product.  As Mathewson and Win-
ter explain: 
Territorial restrictions take on a rich variety of forms in ob-
served distribution contracts.  Under the strongest form of 
this type of restraint—closed territory distribution—the re-
tailer has monopoly rights to all customers within a speci-
fied area.  In other variations sales to customers of compet-
ing retailers may be allowed.  A retailer may be granted the 
exclusive right to locate within an area, but be free to send 
sales representatives to other areas.  The contract may al-
low sales by the retailer in another’s territory only with a 
royalty paid to the competing outlet.  Alternatively, sales 
outside the assigned territory may be allowed, but only at 
list price.  Finally, the retailer may be prohibited from send-
ing representatives outside a designated area, but be free to 
sell to visiting consumers.120 
This section focuses on the economic rationale for this system.  
As discussed below, though, there are a number of non-economic 
reasons related to health and safety for pharmaceutical manufac-
turers to enter into these types of contracts with only authorized 
distributors. 
What concerns some is that these types of restraints enable 
firms to engage in a practice known as “price discrimination.”  
Price discrimination for economists is a value-neutral term mean-
ing that a producer sells the identical product to consumers at dif-
ferent prices.  While there are different kinds of price discrimina-
tion,121 the one that is of relevance here is the common practice 
 
118. The other primary form of vertical restraint is to enter into a contract 
which somehow regulates the price that a distributor can charge. 
119. See SCHERER AND ROSS, supra note 69, at 541. 
120. Frank Mathewson and Ralph A. Winter, On Vertical Restraints and the 
Law: A Reply, 19 RAND J. ECON. 298 (1988). 
121. There are three types of price discrimination generally discussed by 
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known as “third degree” price discrimination, whereby a seller 
charges a different price to customers who can be segmented into a 
relatively few identifiable markets.  This market segmentation is 
based on the different demand function of consumers, or how 
much a consumer wants or will pay for a particular good or ser-
vice.  For example, senior citizens or children will sometimes re-
ceive discounts at restaurants; individuals might pay less for an air-
line ticket if they reserve a seat well in advance; or individuals will 
pay higher cab fares during peak times. 
The particular form of third degree price discrimination at issue 
here concerns territorial-based market segmentation, whereby 
pharmaceutical companies charge different prices to consumers 
based on their geographic location.  In other words, pharmaceutical 
companies divide the world into discrete geographic regions and 
charge different prices to consumers based on the region in which 
they buy the product. 
The underlying motivations of why firms engage in price dis-
crimination is subject to considerable debate.  Different scholars 
attach benign or malignant motivations to territorial restrictions.  
Broadly speaking there are two camps.  Those in the efficiency or 
Chicago School122  take the view that a firm would favor such re-
straints because it would “increase its net revenue by increasing 
distributive efficiency.”123  Others take the opposite view, sub-
scribing to the Post-Chicago school, which contends that, “Vertical 
 
economists.  “First degree” or “perfect” price discrimination is when each consumer 
pays the maximum he or she is willing to pay for the good.  This assumes that the 
seller can identify each individual buyer and his or her demand function—an as-
sumption that is rarely met (if ever) in the real world.  ‘Second degree’ price dis-
crimination occurs when sellers adopt price schedules that give buyers an incentive 
to separate themselves into different price categories, despite the fact that the buyers 
have identical demand curves.  For example, sellers might provide progressive dis-
counts based on the quantity bought (buy one get one free), charge a cover, or tie the 
sale to the purchase of another good.  ‘Third degree’ price discrimination occurs 
when sellers divide customers into two or more discrete groups with different de-
mand functions.  Usually, they are divided into a relatively few identifiable markets 
such as age, or in this case, geographic location. 
122. So-called due to the preponderance of scholars at the University of Chi-
cago that promulgate the efficiency idea. 
123. Robert Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing 
and Market Division, 75 YALE L. J. 373, 403 (1966). 
GROOMBRIDGE.TYPMOCK.DOC 10/3/2006  1:33 PM 
226 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 10 :185 
restraints are often anticompetitive” and that territorial restraints 
promote “the furtherance of cartels.”124  We now analyze these di-
vergent views in more detail.  In so doing, we explore one of the 
classic debates in law and economics. 
2.  The Chicago ‘Efficiency’ School 
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, economic efficiency con-
cerns were becoming increasingly salient in the United States.  
With growing concern about U.S. competitiveness, there was an 
increasing fear that the courts and government were too hostile to 
corporations in the prior decade and hyper-paranoid about the pos-
sibility of monopolistic abuses.  Even economists were not im-
mune from this criticism as evidenced clearly by Nobel economist 
Ronald Coase, who argued that: “If an economist finds some-
thing—a business practice of one sort or another—that he does not 
understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation.”125  He particu-
larly lamented that the leading texts were overly preoccupied with 
“the study of pricing and output policies, especially in oligopolistic 
situations (often called a study of market structure).”126 
What coalesced from much of Coase’s writings, and formal-
ized in legal scholarship by Robert Bork and Richard Posner, was 
the ‘efficiency’ or ‘Chicago School’ view toward vertical re-
straints.  Instead of emphasizing the anticompetitive aspects of ver-
tical restraints, the Chicago School adherents began looking for the 
procompetitive reasons that firms might enter into vertical ar-
rangements, such as limiting the territory in which a distributor 
may sell a product.  As Bork argues, 
In the case of an individual manufacturer’s imposition of 
restraints upon competition among its resellers . . . the 
 
124. Eleanor M. Fox and Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust—Retrospective and 
Prospective: Where Are We Coming From?  Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 936, 984-5 (1987). Within the monopoly school, some go further, singling out 
territorial vertical restraints are more anti-competitive to vertical price restraints, 
stating that: Vertical distribution restrictions are on many counts more obnoxious 
than vertical price restraints.  See, Robert L. Steiner, The Nature of Vertical Re-
straints, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 146 (1985). 
125. Ronald Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in 
POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 67 
(V.R. Fuchs ed., 1972). 
126. See id. at 62. 
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manufacturer’s motive can never be restriction of output.  
An alternative explanation for the manufacturer’s behavior 
is necessary, and the only satisfactory alternative hypothe-
sis is that the manufacturer believes the restraint will in-
crease its net revenue by increasing distributive effi-
ciency. . . .  Otherwise, the manufacturer would not employ 
the restraint.127 
Coase and others such as Oliver Williamson, were also formal-
izing this new thinking in the language of economists.  Specifi-
cally, Coase emphasized the transaction costs, or the costs of con-
tracting (ex-ante and ex-post), as being influential in determining 
how firms organize, or the type of contractual relationships they 
enter.128  In a world of imperfect and incomplete information, and 
in a world where court ordering is not efficacious (particularly with 
contracts between firms in two different countries), producers may 
find vertical restraints as a way to operate more efficiently. 
With these considerations in mind, there has been a growing 
consensus among economists such as Williamson that “efficiency 
purposes are sometimes served by restraints on trade” and that “[a] 
more even-handed assessment in which both monopoly and effi-
ciency purposes are admitted is needed.”129  For example, by not 
allowing unauthorized distributors to sell a product, it is easier for 
producers to monitor the quality in which distributors handle prod-
ucts and lower the costs of gathering information so as to make ef-
ficient investment decisions.  Another reason for a producer to en-
ter into a vertical relationship with only authorized distributors is 
to eliminate what economists refer to as the ‘free-rider’ problem.  
What incentive would authorized distributors have to provide pre-
sales marketing and after-sales services, which are costly, if unau-
thorized distributors could import products from elsewhere and sell 
 
127. Robert Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing 
and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 403 (1966). 
128. Ronald Coase developed these thoughts in his classic paper: On the Nature 
of the Firm.  For an interesting discussion on IPR liability rules and the application 
of the Coase Theorem, see: Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intel-
lectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994). 
129. Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 177, 203 
(1985). 
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them at a lower price?  As Posner argues: 
[I]t is necessary to recall that the manufacturer’s objective 
in restricting competition among its dealers or distributors 
is to induce them to provide greater services to the con-
sumer.  For example, a distributor with an exclusive terri-
tory will not stint in providing services that enhance de-
mand for the product out of fear that another distributor 
will take a free ride on his efforts by selling into the terri-
tory that he has cultivated.130 
With this in mind, Rothnie observes that consumers could be 
worse off if unauthorized distributors free-rode on the marketing 
and services provided by authorized distributors.  As he notes: 
“The parallel importer will rarely incur these (pre-sales marketing 
and after-sales service) costs and so can sell more cheaply than the 
authorized outlets . . . .  If they stop providing these services, 
though, it is quite possible that consumers would be less well 
off.”131 
3.  The Post-Chicago Approach 
This Chicago school view gained increasing acceptance in the 
late 1970s and predominated throughout the 1980s and into the 
early 1990s. Indeed, by the 1990s, it was common to read with re-
gard to the United States that: “Over the past fifteen years, the 
courts and enforcement agencies have created Robert Bork’s anti-
trust paradise.  Antitrust has adopted the Chicago School’s effi-
ciency analysis and the Chicago School’s conclusions about the ef-
fects of business practices.”132 
By the 1990s, however, there was growing momentum for a 
qualification of the Chicago School position.  The outgrowth of 
this backlash was the Post-Chicago school, whose adherents 
claimed that: “These new post-Chicago theories neither ignore nor 
reject the economic analysis of the Chicago School.  Instead, they 
apply the newer methodology of modern industrial organization 
 
130. Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted 
Distributions: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV 6, 11 (1981). 
131. ROTHNIE, supra note 33, at 565. 
132. Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics That Challenge 
Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L. J. 645, 655 (1989). 
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theory to more realistic market structures . . . .” to “identify situa-
tions where vertical mergers and other vertical restraints can raise 
significant competitive concerns.”133 
With specific regard to vertical territorial restraints, for exam-
ple, Rey and Stiglitz examine “the role of exclusive territories in 
reducing the effective degree of competition among firms” and 
how “exclusive territories may be used to deter entry.”134  These 
scholars specifically link territorial restrictions to the foundation of 
the patent system, arguing that a “danger exists with territorial re-
strictions purportedly used to facilitate price discrimination”135 be-
cause it “raises the problem of disproportionately high rewards to 
patentees, which . . . can make for bad patent policy independent of 
how such discrimination fares under antitrust analysis.”136  These 
disproportionate profits, according to adherents of the school, 
would allow firms to raise the costs to smaller rivals and make en-
try by newcomers more difficult.  Similarly, for the large firms that 
did survive, the “increase in the market power of a firm through a 
vertical agreement may provide it with sufficient power to initiate 
or enforce collusive horizontal behavior.”137  In other words, the 
largest firms in competition with each other, would collude to fix 
artificially high prices.138 
 
133. Michael H. Riordan and Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A 
Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L. J. 513, 515 (1995). 
134. Patrick Rey and Joseph Stiglitz, The Role of Exclusive Territories in Pro-
ducers’ Competition, 26 RAND J. ECON., 341, 445-46 (1995). 
135. Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 
HARVARD L. REV. 1815, 1879 (1984). 
136. Id. at 1875. 
137. Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson, Vertical Relations in Health 
Care Markets, in MANAGED CARE & CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKETS 151 (Mi-
chael A. Morrisey ed., 1998). 
138. Two adherents to this view, Krattenmaker and Salop, theorize that: 
Raising rivals’ costs can be a particularly effective method of anticompeti-
tive exclusion. . . .  By embedding a collusive agreement in a vertical con-
tract that raises input prices by restraining sales to rivals, the firm reduces 
coordination costs, making it more efficient at preventing cheating and dis-
tributing the gains from collusion.  Thus, these strategies involve creating 
additional horizontal market power through the mechanism of vertical con-
tracts. 
Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising 
Rivals’ Costs To Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J 209, 224 (1986). 
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Since 1992, the Post-Chicago school has been gaining 
ground.139  The policy implications of such a view would be clear 
with regard to parallel trade.  In the ideal Post-Chicago world, par-
allel trade would be allowed which would undermine the ability of 
firms to price discriminate.  The reason is straightforward as De-
maret explains: “When domestic laws no longer permit import re-
strictions, parallel imports become possible between territories; it 
becomes unfeasible to quote different prices in each territory for 
the patent protected good.”140  Distributors or other middlepersons 
will engage in arbitrage, until a law of one price predominates. 
4.  Problems with the Post-Chicago Approach 
While the authors acknowledge the high level of scholarship of 
many of these Post-Chicago studies, we remain skeptical of many 
of its conclusions.  We find that there is very little difference be-
tween the Post-Chicago approach and antiquated and debunked 
theories of the old Monopoly school.141  Adherents to the school 
attempt to distinguish themselves from both the Monopoly and 
Chicago approach by noting that they employ new advanced eco-
nomic tools and methods, particularly game theory.  As two writers 
within the post-Chicago approach, Michael Riordan and Steve 
Salop, argue: “Along with other advances in economic theory, the 
game theoretic analysis of strategic behavior forms the core of 
 
139. One of the first actions by assistant attorney general Anne Bingaman, for 
example, was to repeal the 1985 Vertical Restraints Guidelines developed during the 
Reagan administration.  One Congressman, Jack Brooks, even wrote to Justice that: 
“It is not that vertical integration of production and distribution automatically poses 
a competitive threat of foreclosure and barriers to entry to new entrants; it may not.  
The difficulty faced is that vertical mergers, for the past 12 years, were deemed 
barely worthy of any careful competitive scrutiny at all by the antitrust enforcement 
agencies.”  Letter from Congressman Jack Brooks, Chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee, to DOJ Assistant Attorney General Anne Bingaman and FTC Chairman 
Janet Steiger, (Nov. 4, 1993), in Riordan & Salop, supra note 133, at 514. 
140. PAUL DEMARET, PATENTS, TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS, AND EEC LAW: A 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 71 (IIC Studies: Studies in Industrial Property and 
Copyright Law, Vol. 2, Freidrich-Karl Beier et al. eds., 1978). 
141. Indeed, the language that scholars in this approach sometimes use sug-
geststhis to be the case.  As Baker notes in his survey article on the distinctive char-
acteristics of the post-Chicago approach, “economists have recently rehabilitated the 
old view, questioned in Chicago, that scale economies can create an entry barrier.”  
Baker, supra note 132, at 651. 
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what has been termed the post-Chicago approach.”142 
While game theory is not new, it appears that post-Chicago 
scholars are talking about recent developments in games in which 
firms have imperfect (and perhaps incomplete) information.  The 
distinction between games of perfect and imperfect information is 
critical to understanding the post-Chicago approach.  The distinc-
tion between the two types of games is straightforward.  In games 
of perfect information, players (in this case firms) know and pos-
sess full information about what has happenedin the past.  This 
contrasts with games of imperfect information where players are 
not sure about all that has happenedin the past.143 
While games of incomplete information correspond more 
closely with reality, it is still vital to make certain assumptions 
about how individuals interpret that reality.  Not surprisingly, these 
assumptions are subjective.  Overwhelmingly, scholars within the 
Post-Chicago approach assume that firms have a predisposed bias 
to collude with one another to fix prices in an anti-competitive 
fashion.  For example, it is widely accepted that cartels tend to 
break down over the long-term because individual firms have in-
centives to cheat—in other words, maintain output but just slightly 
undercut the prices of other cartel members in order to increase 
market share (a classic prisoner’s dilemma situation).  Proponents 
of the Post-Chicago school argue, though, that if firms are collud-
ing in a cartel to fix prices in a world of imperfect information, 
they will not know whether firms are cheating other cartel mem-
bers or there is some other idiosyncratic phenomenon accounting 
for the price change.  In the words of one adherent, the new (and 
better) post-Chicago game-theoretic models: 
[P]resume that colluding firms have imperfect information 
about the explanation for price declines: they cannot ini-
tially tell the difference between a random decline in indus-
try demand and a rival cheating on their cartel.  In such an 
industry, collusive price can be maintained for a long time, 
punctuated by occasional episodes of increased competition 
 
142. Riordan & Salop, supra note 133, at 518. 
143. See Ken Binmore, FUN AND GAMES 100(1992). 
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whenever demand declines unexpectedly.144 
But one could just as easily reach the opposite conclusion as 
well, depending on one’s assumptions about trust.  These scholars 
assume that firms are relatively trusting of each other and would 
not attach malicious motives to each others’ actions.  In short, they 
would view price differences between cartel members as an aberra-
tion.  Cynics or skeptics might view the world quite differently, 
and to the authors’ knowledge, the business world is not particu-
larly known for being trusting of competitors.  Other assumptions 
made by post-Chicago scholars are troubling as well because they 
exclude any procompetive or efficiency motivations due to vertical 
integration.145 
This is not to say that Chicago or efficiency school advocates 
do not make simplifying assumptions as well.  Indeed, they do but 
this speaks to the broader problem of using highly abstract game-
theoretic models to justify public policy conclusions.  There is no 
reason that games of imperfect information could not be designed 
where one starts with different base-level assumptions that could 




144. Baker, supra note 132, at 650. 
145. In agreement with Klass and Salinger, many of the post-Chicago models 
are perhaps best described as “exemplifying theories.”  In other words, they make 
some very restrictive assumptions.  The models of Hart and Tirole, for example, rule 
out  “any potentially procompetitive effect and leaving room only for the anticom-
petitive effect.  It provides no foundation for asking what facts one would examine 
to distinguish between procompetitive and anticompetive vertical mergers.”  Michael 
W. Klass & Michael A. Salinger, Do new theories of vertical foreclosure provide 
sound guidance for consent agreements in vertical merger cases?, 1995 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 667, 679-80.  A similar point can be made about the post-Chicago games de-
veloped by Ordover, Saloner and Salop because  their assumptions preclude any ef-
ficiency from mergers.  See id. at 681.  In general, the price in a duopoly market can 
be anywhere between the perfectly competitive and the monopoly price.  Ordover et 
al. make the extreme assumption, that prior to a vertical merger, the perfectly com-
petitive price prevails upstream.  As a result, they too rule out any efficiencies to the 
merging firm from transferring the input at marginal cost.  That assumption is fine 
for demonstrating what might happen, but it is of no value for trying to assess the 
conditions under which the harmful effects from vertical mergers outweigh the bene-
ficial ones.  See id. at 682. 
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It is this ambiguity within game-theory itself that leads the au-
thors to question the degree to which the post-Chicago approach 
justifies a shift on government scrutiny of vertical relationships.  
While the pharmaceutical industry is not necessarily representa-
tive, our previous work on this subject146 does lend support to the 
conclusion of scholars who conclude that the Post-Chicago ap-
proach “does not justify substantially more intervention” on the 
part of government to limit vertical arrangements between firms.147  
Part of the reason we concur with this view is that abusive price 
discrimination, particularly in the pharmaceutical industry, is a dif-
ficult condition to achieve, much less maintain.  The next section 
examines this claim in more detail. 
B.  Possibilities for Abusive Price Discrimination 
1.  The Prerequisites for Abusive Price Discrimination 
As defined above, price discrimination is the process of charg-
ing different prices to different consumers, in this case in different 
geographic regions.  There are three basic prerequisites for price-
discrimination, all of which must hold simultaneously.  First, there 
must be two or more distinct groups of consumers whose demands 
for the product differ in sensitivity or elasticity to price.  In short, 
consumers have different tastes and vary in the amount they de-
mand a product.  Second, trade between the higher-price and 
lower-price consumers must be restricted or impossible.  Finally, 
third, the seller must be relatively free from competition by sellers 
of equivalent products.148 
The first condition we stipulate exists.  As Schweitzer ac-
knowledges, “The first consideration in explaining international 
drug price differences is differences in tastes and preferences that 
alter demand.  Significant differences exist across cultures, for ex-
 
146. See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 5. 
147. See Klass & Salinger, supra note 145, at 669.  Others concur as well, argu-
ing that: “Although examples can be constructed in which welfare decreases with 
restraints . . . a rule superior to per se legality of purely vertical restraints has not, in 
our view, been offered.”  Mathewson and Winter, supra note 120, at 300.  They are 
referring to the 1986 Rey and Tirole piece which conforms to the Post-Chicago ap-
proach.  See Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, The Logic of Vertical Restraints,  76 
AMERICAN ECON. REV. 921 (1986). 
148. See Scherer and Ross, supra note 69, ch. 13. 
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ample, in choice of drugs as well as their dosage and form of ad-
ministration.”149 It is also clear that allowing pharmaceutical patent 
holders the right to sign contracts limiting the territory in which the 
distributor may sell the product satisfies the second prerequisite for 
price-discrimination.  As Batson argues, “For price tiering to work 
(allowing appropriate prices to be set for different markets early in 
the life cycle) the vaccine market must be segmented by purchas-
ing power and have minimal risk of parallel imports.”150  The 
point, though, as developed in more detail below is that this is en-
tirely consistent with promoting a strong research-based pharma-
ceutical industry.  While speaking to the case of patent-based in-
dustries at-large, Demaret argues, and we concur that: 
Territorial discrimination is consistent with the patent ra-
tionale.  It increases the patentee’s reward by enabling him 
to capture a larger part of the potential value attached to his 
invention and, thereby, intensifies the incentive to invent.  
To be implemented, however, a system of territorial dis-
crimination often requires that inter-territorial competition 
between patentee’s buyers or licensees, and between subse-
quent purchasers of the product based on the patent be cur-
tailed.151 
The third condition, however, related to the freedom of compe-
tition from equivalent products, is also crucial to the ability of 
pharmaceutical companies to price discriminate, particularly in an 
abusive fashion.  It is important to make this qualification because 
linguistically the term ‘price discrimination’ is misleading; it takes 
on a number of negative connotations stemming from the word 
discrimination.152  Thus, it is more accurate to say abusive or puta-
tive price discrimination, or perhaps, price differentials. 
 
149. SCHWEITZER, supra note 29, at 147. 
150. A. Batson, Win-Win Interactions Between the Public and Private Sectors,  
NATURE MEDICINE: VACCINE SUPPLEMENT, May 1998, 489-90. 
151. DEMARET, supra note 140, at 35. 
152. As Rozek and Rapp note,  “Because of the legal provisions against price 
discrimination in the U.S. (and Europe), it has taken on a pejorative tone—akin to 
race discrimination—rather than retaining the more appropriate value-neutral defini-
tion.” Richard P. Rozek and Richard T. Rapp, Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals: 
The Impact on Welfare and Innovation, 7 J. ECON. INTEG. 183 (1992). 
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2.  The Relationship Between Market Structure & Collusion 
This section establishes why abusive price discrimination is 
difficult to maintain, particularly in the pharmaceutical industry.  
For the moment, the article makes the extreme (and false) assump-
tion that the price differentials between countries are based solely 
on the decisions of pharmaceutical manufacturers to price dis-
criminate.  Proponents of a doctrine of international exhaustion fa-
vor parallel trade because it will undermine the ability of firms to 
price discriminate.  According to those who support parallel trade, 
pharmaceutical companies charge different (and in high-priced re-
gions abusive) prices to consumers in order to maximize profits to 
such an extent that consumer welfare suffers.  As one trade asso-
ciation wrote about parallel trade at-large, “Parallel trade means 
that the consumer obtains the same goods for less money,” and 
that, “[p]arallel trade depresses price fixing.”153  This bold (and 
largely unsubstantiated) claim gets to the heart of the debate on 
parallel importation.  Others speak of broader issues such as a 
well-functioning market place and efficient allocation of resources.  
As Frederick Abbott maintains: 
If developed country producers are not pressured to become 
more efficient as a consequence of price competition, this 
will distort the efficient allocation of resources in the de-
veloped country . . . .  Parallel imports will serve to assure 
that adequate level of price competition is maintained in in-
ternational markets.  Price competition is essential to the ef-
fective operation of comparative advantage, and to achiev-
ing efficiency gains throughout the international trading 
system.154 
Abbott’s argument that markets will operate more efficiently 
rests on a faulty assumption—that intrabrand competition is the 
only way to promote efficient and contestable markets.  This as-
sumption ignores the crucial role that interbrand competition plays.  
 
153. European Merchants Association, Trade Marks Directive and Parallel 
Trade 3  BROADCAST MIMEO, (October 1998). 
154. Frederick Abbott, First Report (Final) To The Committee on International 
Trade Law Of The International Association On The Subject Of Parallel Importa-
tion, 1998 J. INT’L ECON. L. 621-22 (1998). 
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Claims that pharmaceutical manufacturers engage in price-fixing 
by definition assume that there is horizontal cartel behavior on the 
part of firms.  The reason is that if a pharmaceutical (or any) manu-
facturer of a product is charging too high of a price then the market 
is ripe for entry by competitors.  In short, inter-brand competition 
will mitigate the problem.  This is particularly the case if the mar-
ket structure of the industry is non-concentrated, where a large 
number of firms operate in the industry. 
What often concerns proponents of parallel trade, however, is 
the prospect that competitors will collude to continue charging the 
higher price.  In essence and practice, the leading pharmaceutical 
firms collude explicitly or tacitly on prices.155  If this claim is right, 
then even interbrand competition will be insufficient to undermine 
the abusive price discriminatory practices of firms, in this case 
pharmaceuticals. 
There is a rich literature in economics on the conditions that 
would foster such collusion, stemming back to the pioneering work 
of Augustin Cournot in the 1838.  Broadly speaking, the consensus 
of the literature is that anti-competitive horizontal collusion is 
more successful as the number of firms in an industry decreases.  
As Williamson notes: “anticompetitive effects are likely to exist in 
highly concentrated industries; but because vertical integration in 
low or moderately concentrated industries is likely to promote effi-
ciency, it will rarely pose an antitrust issue.”156 
The argument of Cournot is that in a duopolistic (two-firm) 
situation, both firms are better off by choosing an output that 
maximizes the profits of the firms in comparison to engaging in 
cut-throat competition.  The key insight of Cournot is that the car-
tel is more difficult to maintain as the number of firms in the in-
dustry increase.  As Radner notes, “a larger number of firms would 
 
155. As defined by Friedman: “The idea behind tacit collusion is that the firms 
in an industry can collude, or, more properly, attain the kind of outcome that is usu-
ally associated with collusion, in the absence of any kind of agreement or even dis-
course.  Somehow, all firms know what is in their best interest, and without explicit 
coordination, they do the right thing.” JAMES FRIEDMAN, OLIGOPOLY THEORY 132 
(1983). 
156. Oliver E. Williamson, Vertical Merger Guidelines: Interpreting the 1982 
Reforms, 71 CAL. L. REV. 604, 615 (1983). 
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lead to a larger industry output and a lower price (in equilibrium) 
and that as the number of firms increased without limit, the corre-
sponding equilibria would converge to the situation he called ‘un-
limited competition,’ in which marginal cost equaled price.”157 
There are several reasons why this might be the case.  First, the 
cost of organizing larger numbers is higher in non-concentrated 
sectors than in concentrated ones.  As Mitchell argues, “When an 
industry has many firms and entry is easy, collusive behavior be-
comes nearly impossible.”158  Second, statistically speaking, there 
is a lower chance of what Bowman calls a “maverick firm”—one 
which sabotages cooperative efforts for “‘irrational’ ideological or 
psychological reasons.”159  Third, it is more difficult to monitor 
and sanction violators of collusive agreements.  Apart from the 
practicalities involved in finding out the quantities produced by 
other firms, the actions of individual firms in non-concentrated 
sectors are less affected by the actions of others firms.  This con-
trasts with the situation, where “in a market that will continue in 
operation for a long time, an oligopolistic firm will naturally be 
concerned with how its present actions may influence the behavior 
of its rivals in the future.”160  The threats of firms to punish viola-
tors by disrupting the market are thus more credible.  As Chamber-
lin argues: 
If each seeks his maximum profit rationally and intelli-
gently, he will realize that when there are only two or a few 
sellers his own move has a considerable effect upon his 
competitors, and that this makes it idle to suppose that they 
will accept without retaliation the losses he forces upon 
them.  Since the result of a cut by any one is inevitably to 
decrease his own profits, no one will cut, and although the 
sellers are entirely independent, the equilibrium result is the 
 
157. Roy Radner, Collusive Behavior in Noncooperative Epsilon-Equilibria of 
Oligopolies with Long but Finite Lives, 22 J.ECON. THEORY 22, 136-154 (1980), re-
printed in GAME THEORY OF ECONOMICS 373 (Ariel Rubinstein ed., 1990). 
158. EDWARD J. MITCHELL, VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 42 
(1976). 
159. JOHN BOWMAN, CAPITALIST COLLECTIVE ACTION: COMPETITION, 
COOPERATION, AND CONFLICT IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 17-18 (G.A. Cohen, et al, eds. 
1989). 
160. FRIEDMAN, OLIGOPOLY THEORY, supra note 155, at 1. 
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same as though there were a monopolistic agreement be-
tween them.161 
3.  The Market Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry 
The above theoretical discussion needs to be applied to the 
specific case of the pharmaceutical industry.  In so doing, it be-
comes clear that the possibility of illegal price collusion and fixing 
would be very difficult to achieve, much less maintain, in the 
pharmaceutical industry.  The reason is that competition is alive 
and well in the pharmaceutical industry and there is a very low 
level of concentration.  There are new entrants into the field—and 
those that fail exit and do so rapidly.  In the language of econo-
mists, the pharmaceutical industry is not oligopolistic, where only 
a few firms dominate. 
While some argue that pharmaceutical companies collude to 
“raise the height of the barriers to entry faced by entrants to par-
ticular patented products,”162 the bulk of evidence suggests other-
wise.  In one of the most comprehensive studies to date, scholars 
concluded that: “The evidence does not, however, suggest any sub-
stantial scale-economy barriers in production or distribution.” 163  
And that, “we see little in this evidence that suggests any very ac-
tive attempt by producers of branded drugs to deter the entry of ri-
vals . . . [and that] the overall response seems to be one that takes 
the likely extent of entry as given.”164  This trend has largely been 
the case since the end of World War II.  As these scholars note: 
[T]he [pharmaceutical] industry assumed its modern re-
search-oriented form after World War II, when a number of 
firms emerged that both carried out extensive research and 
maintained extensive sales forces to promote their innova-
tions.  Their rise, however, was not accompanied by a de-
cline in the number of small firms, and even among the re-
 
161. EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC 
COMPETITION (1933), quoted in JEAN TIROLE, THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 240 (1988). 
162. Daniel Chudnovsky, Patents and Trademarks in Pharmaceuticals, 11 
WORLD DEV. 188 (1983). 
163. Richard E. Caves et al., Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the 
U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry,  BROOKINGS PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS 10 (1991). 
164. Id. at 46-47. 
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search-oriented firms, concentration is low.165 
The recent data on market structure of the pharmaceutical in-
dustry coincide with these findings, as the table in Appendix A 
demonstrates. 
Two important points from the attached table stand out.  The 
first is that the market share of the top firms is quite small.  When 
the top four firms have a market share of roughly only 20%, it 
seems unlikely that they would successfully be able to enforce a 
cartel and price-fix.  Even with mergers taking place in the indus-
try, however, there is clearly a role for small manufacturers.  One 
report, for example, notes that: “With an increasing trend for 
pharmaceutical companies to outsource raw materials, there are 
tremendous manufacturing and sales opportunities for chemical 
companies who supply pharmaceutical actives and intermedi-
ates.”166  A role for small pharmaceutical companies is clearly in 
place, and indeed encouraged by the big players. 
The second point is that the market shares can fluctuate wildly, 
which would make cartel behavior even more difficult.  This coin-
cides and supports the thesis discussed above that investing in 
pharmaceutical research and development is an inherently risky 
endeavor, with few products actually resulting in a profit for phar-
maceutical companies.  In a four year period, for example, Phar-
macia and Upjohn went from the 11th largest producer to 18th, 
while Hoescht went from #3 to #9.  Conversely, some pharmaceu-
tical companies found their research and development paying off 
handsomely: Merck went from #4 in 1993 to #1 in 1997; similarly, 
Pfizer moved from up #10 to #6.  Overall, though, as Comanor 
notes, there are “substantial shifts in market share” and that: 
Despite the controversy over the degree of monopoly 
power exercised by leading firms in this industry, there has 
been little dispute over the presence of extensive product 
competition.  New products are introduced into therapeutic 
markets where they compete actively with existing prod-
ucts, and those that cannot maintain their market position 
 
165. Id. at at 8. 
166. See IMS Health Report, Business Solutions (current as of November 1998) 
<www.ims-global.com/solution/bulk.htm>. 
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are often withdrawn.  High rates of product introduction 
and obsolescence are found regardless of the magnitude of 
price-cost margins.167 
4.  The Rapid Introduction of Competitors 
Critics will point out that the above discussion is misleading 
because specific drugs have no competitors.  They argue that 
“market behavior is essentially oligopolistic and assessing the ex-
tent of competition by simply counting drugs would be errone-
ous.”168  As explained by Schut and Van Bergeijk: 
Since drugs are by their very nature rather heterogeneous (a 
gastric ulcer should not be healed with aspirin), the phar-
maceutical market can be divided into a large number of 
independent sub-markets (characterized by low cross elas-
ticities of demand), which correspond to certain therapeutic 
classes.  A low level of concentration for the industry as a 
whole (some 5% market share for the largest drug firm) 
thus conceals the real market power which is exercised at 
the sub-market level . . . .169 
Economists call such a situation where some firms might have 
temporary market power in a sub-market a ‘differentiated oligop-
oly.’  And while it is true that such a condition potentially exists in 
the pharmaceutical industry, several qualifications are in order.  
First, the number of drugs that achieve this temporary market 
power are very few.  In contrast to Schut and Van Bergeijk, Roth-
nie observes that: 
Many drugs affect people in different ways . . . .  Thus, 
there is sometimes scope for different types of drug or dif-
ferent formulations to be used against the same or similar 
ailments.  Therefore, demand for even the best-selling 
drugs is quite small as a proportion of the overall demand 
 
167. William S. Comanor, The Political Economy of the Pharmaceutical Indus-
try, 24 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1178, 1186 (1986). 
168. Julio J. Nogues, Social Costs and Benefits of Introducing Patent Protec-
tion for Pharmaceutical Drugs in Developing Countries, THE DEVELOPING 
ECONOMIES, XXXI-1, (March 1993), p. 29. 
169. Frederick T. Schut and Peter A.G. Van Bergeijk, International Price Dis-
crimination: The Pharmaceutical Industry, 44 WORLD DEV.  1141, 1142 (1986). 
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for drugs.  Some achieve market shares of about 5 percent, 
but most successful drugs usually only approach 1 to 2 per-
cent.170 
Second, at most such a condition can operate only for the life 
of the patent.  Given lengthy testing periods, such a temporary mo-
nopoly could exist at most for several years.  Third, and most im-
portant, there is overwhelming evidence that competitors to drugs 
appear well before the expiration of a patent for a particular drug.  
Contrary to what Schut and Van Bergeijk claim, “An innovative 
drug in a new therapeutic class may have temporary market exclu-
sivity; however, the entry of similar but chemically distinct ‘thera-
peutic’ substitutes has accelerated over time and now typically oc-
curs within months of the first entrant.”171 
This is even more likely if a pharmaceutical company is taking 
advantage of its temporary monopoly and charging inordinately 
high prices.  The reason is that entry barriers are so low in the in-
dustry, and “although actual competitors for a given drug or ther-
apy may be few, potential entrants are numerous.”172  Pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers have to be wary of charging too high of a price.  
In such a situation, the market is ripe for interbrand competition 
because “a relatively high introductory price will prevent the prod-
uct from gaining market share and thus may not be sustained.”173  
For this reason, as Schweitzer notes: “As important as patent pro-
tection is in granting marketing exclusivity, it must be remembered 
that technology evolves quickly in this industry, and competitive 
products are frequently introduced even during an originating 
drug’s patent period.”174  He also notes that: 
Even when a drug is made by only one company, this does 
not mean that it has no competitors.  Often several different 
drugs appear on the market to treat the same medical condi-
 
170. ROTHNIE, supra note 33, at 479. 
171. Danzon, The Economics of Parallel Trade,  supra note 6, at 296. 
172. Caves et al., supra note 163, at 9. 
173. Richard P. Rozek and Ruth Berkowitz,  The Effects of Patent Protection 
on the Prices of Pharmaceutical Products—Is Intellectual Property Protection Rais-
ing the Drug Bill in Developing Countries?, 1 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 179, 215-16 
(1998). 
174. SCHWEITZER, supra note 29, at 230. 
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tion . . . .  Some of these imitative drugs can serve as im-
portant competitors for a single-source drug because they 
use the same biological mechanism as innovative drugs.  
Although similar to the innovative drug, the imitative prod-
ucts are distinct chemical entities.  They can therefore in-
troduce competition into the market well before patents ex-
pire, thus limiting the ability of the innovative drug 
manufacturers to sustain high prices.175 
For example, according to the U.S. Congressional Budget Of-
fice, this is exactly what happened in the case of Prozac: 
When Prozac was introduced into the antidepressant market 
in 1988 it offered a new treatment with fewer side effects 
than many of the older antidepressants.  The result was that 
Prozac became one of the five most widely prescribed 
drugs in the United States, enjoying worldwide sales of $1 
billion in 1992.  Such a market was a tempting target for 
other companies.  Within five years, three lower-priced 
drugs, all using some variant of the same treatment, were 
on the market in the United States.  Four other drugs are 
being sold in Europe and await FDA approval for U.S. sale.  
Because there are several close rivals, manufacturers of an-
tidepressant drugs are being forced to offer discounts, even 
though their patents last until after the year 2000, when ge-
neric versions will be permitted to enter the market.176 
Of course, those accusing the pharmaceutical industry of hori-
zontal price-fixing are quick to point out that the market shares and 
prices of some pharmaceutical products do not decline signifi-
cantly when competitors are introduced, even after a patent ex-
pires.  There are two possible explanations for this, one malignant, 
one more benign.  The malignant explanation is that pharmaceuti-
cal companies possess a monopoly of information which they dis-
tribute to physicians and hospitals.  Generic makers do not possess 
the revenue to advertise and thus physicians, and by definition, pa-
tients, remain uninformed.  Consequently, physicians remain loyal 
 
175. Id. at 107. 
176. CBO 1994 Reports, quoted in SCHWEITZER, supra note 29, at 107. 
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to branded pharmaceuticals even after a patent expires.  Such an 
argument might have been plausible decades ago, it is less so now 
given advances in technology and the information ‘super high-
way.’  The reason is straightforward: “Physicians have access to 
information about all competitive products in a therapeutical area, 
so brand loyalty, resulting in part from imperfect information, can 
no longer support the thesis of monopolistic structure of the phar-
maceutical industry.”177 
The more benign reason stems from the fact that some con-
sumers value brands that they are familiar with and do not trust ge-
nerics.  As Scherer notes: 
[W]hen generic substitutes exist, the world of drug buyers 
consists of two quite different groups—those who are 
price-sensitive and those who are not. . . . [O]nce generic 
substitutes enter at much lower prices, the market is bifur-
cated, and the incumbent branded seller commonly finds it 
more profitable to desert the price-sensitive market than to 
reduce the prices quoted to price-insensitive customers.178 
Simply put, some consumers are willing to pay a higher price 
for products they know and trust.  The reason that in some branded 
drugs we do not see a significant decline in prices or market share 
is brand loyalty and the goodwill or trust that consumers attach to 
certain companies and products.  Numerous studies have found 
that the maintenance of market share and price levels “appear to 
come on the demand side from the accumulated goodwill assets of 
branded producers and any concerns about quality differences be-
tween branded and generic drugs.”179  And that the period of mar-
ket exclusivity “provided ample time for identification of the drug 
with a specific brand name and the development of brand loy-
alty.”180  The point, however, is that there is extensive competition 
and consumers have a choice to buy the branded product at a 
higher price or the generic product at a lower price.  Overall, 
 
177. SCHWEITZER, supra note 29, at 108. 
178. Scherer,  Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceu-
tical Industry, supra note 80, at 101. 
179. Caves, et al., supra note 163, at 10-11. 
180. COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 150 (Meir 
Statman & Robert B. Helms eds., 1996). 
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though, the evidence suggests that the pharmaceutical industry is a 
highly competitive one. 
 
Interestingly, even under the restrictive (and false) assumption 
that price differences between countries are based exclusively on 
the price discriminating behavior of pharmaceutical companies, re-
search suggests that allowing patent holders control over parallel 
imports might actually increase overall world welfare (including 
both producers and consumers).  Malueg and Schwartz note the 
importance of including producer surplus as well as consumer sur-
plus in the analysis.  As they argue, “manufacturers of products 
prone to parallel imports also are predominantly from richer (more 
industrialized) countries, and those manufacturers would gain from 
discrimination.  Thus, allowing complete international price dis-
crimination need not systematically reduce the national welfare of 
industrialized countries.”181 
Critics such as Abbott maintain that studies such as those con-
ducted by Malueg and Schwartz are flawed.  In his own words, 
“Most importantly, they (Malueg and Schwartz) do not consider 
the effects of an international price discrimination system on the 
international allocation of resources.”182  The problem with this as-
sertion is that Abbott appears to only be taking into account con-
sumer welfare as opposed to the welfare of consumers and produc-
ers (Marshallian welfare).  It also reflects Abbott’s belief that IP 
protection should be subordinate to other trade considerations.  The 
strength of the Malueg and Schwartz analysis is that it looks at 
price discrimination as the sole cause of parallel imports, an as-
sumption that clearly does not hold in the real world.  Based on 
this restrictive assumption, however, Malueg and Schwartz con-
clude that: “our analysis casts doubt on the view that world welfare 
would be enhanced by encouraging unrestricted parallel imports in 
 
181. David Malueg and Marius Schwartz,  Parallel Imports, Demand Disper-
sion, and International Price Discrimination, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS GROUP, 
ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PAPER 93-6, (August 25, 1993), 
p. 19. 
182. Abbott, First Report (Final) To The Committee on International Trade 
Law Of The International Association On The Subject Of Parallel Importation, su-
pra note 154, at 620. 
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order to undermine price discrimination.”183 
5.  The Politics of Pharmaceutical Pricing 
It is important to point out that the above discussion is based on 
an assumption; that is, that price differentials in the pharmaceutical 
industry are based solely on the decisions of pharmaceutical com-
panies.  While studies do show that price discrimination takes 
place,184 the reality is that price differentials are determined by a 
host of other factors outside of demand differences and pricing to 
market strategies by pharmaceutical companies.  These factors are 
often beyond the control of pharmaceutical companies but are im-
portant to discuss.  The reason is that a doctrine of international 
exhaustion will have little impact on consumer welfare because 
other factors (largely governmental interventions) will overwhelm 
the pricing strategies of pharmaceutical manufacturers.  Indeed, 
there is a danger in making consumer welfare conclusions based 
solely on price differentials between countries.  Such studies are 
fraught with problems.  As Danzon notes, “a comparison of prices 
alone, even if undertaken with the best feasible methods, does not 
provide a valid basis for policy prescriptions about pharmaceutical 
regulation because of other effects on costs, product availability, 
and consumption patterns.”185 
 
183. Malueg and Schwartz, supra note 181, at 20.  They suggest offering lower 
prices to LDCs to increase welfare, because their demand elasticities are much 
higher than those of industrialized countries due to vastly lower peer capita incomes.  
Once again, however, they offer no practical way this could be accomplished 
through public policies—and confine themselves to noting that private suppliers 
(pharmaceuticals) are responding to this reality by correlating their prices somewhat 
to per capita incomes. 
184. Schut and Van Bergeijk, found “[a] strong positive relationship between 
price level and per capita GDP” with “a 10% increase in per capita income being as-
sociated with on average 8% higher drug prices.”  Schut and Van Bergeijk, supra 
note 169, at 1141.  This suggests “that the pharmaceutical industry charges what the 
market ‘will bear.’”  Id. 
185. Patricia M. Danzon, The Uses and Abuses of International Price Compari-
sons, in COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 85-86 (Rob-
ert B. Helms ed., 1996).  The reasons are manifold as Danzon continues, on pp. 88-
89.  Specifically: 
There are several indices one could use to measure the impact of price dif-
ferentials on consumer welfare but certain restrictive assumptions apply.  
Those assumptions include: identical consumer preference structures in the 
two circumstances under comparison; identical range of products and 
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The factors that influence pharmaceutical prices are manifold.  
First, there is often variation in the exchange rate between coun-
tries, of which parallel importers will attempt to take advantage.  
An extensive literature documents that parallel imports surge when 
a country’s exchange rate appreciates because import prices do not 
decrease in the same proportion as the depreciation of the other 
country’s currency.186  The ability of companies to respond to 
these differences is limited as well.  As Rothnie points out, “The 
role of currency movements in causing sharp increases in the vol-
umes of parallel imports may indicate that firms do make some ef-
fort, albeit apparently unsuccessful, to ensure that price differences 
between markets are kept within some bounds.”187 
Second, intellectual property rights regimes vary significantly 
by country.  Patents are current in some countries but not in all.  As 
such, generic competition can lead to downward price pressures in 
some countries.  The TRIPS Agreement, while an important step in 
the right direction, does not lead to an approximate harmonization 
of IPR regimes; instead, it provides only a minimum set of stan-
 
product qualities available; control for all relevant substitutes and comple-
ments; and informed consumer choice in competitive markets.  For interna-
tional drug price comparisons, all the assumptions necessary for welfare 
conclusions are violated.  Consumer preferences probably differ cross-
nationally, and the range of available products certain differs.  Actual drug 
consumption patterns do not reflect the choices of informed consumers in 
competitive markets; rather, they reflect medical norms, subject to the in-
centives and constraints of insurance and reimbursement systems and regu-
latory regimes.  Indexes that focus only on drug prices fail to control for 
prices or quantities of other medical services that are important substitutes 
and complements for drugs, such as patient time and the price of a physi-
cian office visit.  These violations of standard assumptions imply that index 
numbers cannot be used to justify conclusions about consumer welfare. 
Id. at 88-89. 
186. A cottage industry of research sprang up during the late 1980s analyzing 
the connection between currency fluctuations, particularly the wide swings in the 
dollar, and grey market imports.  See, for example: Robert Feenstra,  Symmetric 
Pass-Through of Tariffs and Exchange Rates Under Imperfect Competition: An Em-
pirical Test, 27 J. WORLD COMPETITION 25 (1989); Rudiger Dornbusch,  Exchange 
Rates and Prices,  77 AM. ECON. REV. 93 (1987); Alberto Giovanni,  Exchange 
Rates and Traded Goods Prices, 24 J. INT’L ECON. 45 (1988); and Kenneth Kasa, 
Adjustment Costs and Pricing-to-Market: Theory and Evidence, 32 J. INT’L. ECON. 1 
(1992).  See also ROTHNIE, supra note 33, at 587. 
187. ROTHNIE, supra note 33, at 587. 
GROOMBRIDGE.TYPMOCK.DOC 10/3/2006  1:33 PM 
1999] PARALLEL TRADE & PHARMACEUTICALS 247 
dards.  It leaves the implementation of the rules to governments 
subject to multilateral review.  This leads to particular problems 
for countries that choose to extend the life of patents, as is their 
right.  As Harvey Bale points out: “If parallel trade were permitted, 
the purpose of extending the life of patents in countries which ex-
tend patent rights would be compromised by the competition of the 
innovator’s own product coming from other markets where generic 
versions exist.”188 
The third and most important factor explaining why pharma-
ceutical companies have little control over and accounts for differ-
ences in prices are the different regulatory regimes in different 
countries.189  This wide variance in market harmonization in the 
health industry between nations, even within the EU, should give 
considerable pause to those advocating a doctrine of international 
exhaustion for patent holders.  As Danzon argues, “parallel trade in 
pharmaceuticals does not yield the normal efficiency gains from 
trade because countries achieve low pharmaceutical prices by ag-
gressive regulation, not through superior efficiency.  In fact, paral-
lel trade reduces economic welfare by undermining price differen-
tials between markets.”190  It does so because it “exploits regulated 
price differences that do not reflect real cost difference, [therefore] 
such trade can actually increase societal costs because of additional 
transportation and administrative costs, yet still be profitable for 
the trader.”191  For this reason, even some proponents of parallel 
importation acknowledge the special case of pharmaceuticals, in 
light of the variation in national health policies.192 
 
188. Bale, supra note 41, at 643. 
189. See F.M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 80, at 109 7. 
190. Patricia M. Danzon, The Economics of Parallel Trade, supra note 6, at 
293. 
191. See id.  Burstall and Senior concur, noting that: “parallel trade represents a 
market distortion and not a market correction . . . .” In some cases the product has 
been transported twice in order to end up being consumed in the country where it 
was made.  The absurdity of this is clear.  In a properly working market redundant 
activities such as double transporting would disappear.  Burstall and Senior, supra 
note 31, at 16-17. 
192. Frederick Abbott, for example, argues that:  
One can envisage an exception to an open international parallel importation 
rule based upon government price controls directed at a specific industry, 
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C.  The Benefits of Territorial Vertical Restraints in the Phar-
maceutical Industry 
1.  How Parallel Trade Would Undermine Pharmaceutical 
R&D 
This section lays out the economics of the pharmaceutical in-
novation process and describes the negative impact of parallel im-
ports on the ability of drug firms to support the long-term R&D vi-
tal to that process.  As noted above, today, U.S. pharmaceutical 
firms are spending about 20 percent of total sales on R&D.  How-
ever, if all costs including R&D, production, distribution, market-
ing and administrative costs are expressed in discounted present 
value at the time drugs are launched, R&D accounts for approxi-
mately 30 percent of total costs (manufacturing and distribution, 29 
percent; marketing, 24 percent).193  There are several reasons for 
the high R&D costs, including the large number of ‘dry holes,’ 
(compounds investigated and then abandoned before commerciali-
zation) and foregone interest (capital costs) because of the long lag 
(as long as fifteen years) between commitment of R&D and the 
successful launch of a product. 
A major problem in pricing for pharmaceuticals arises from the 
fact that the large R&D share of total costs is in reality what is 
termed a global joint cost, that is the cost is the same no matter 
how many consumers or countries utilize a drug.  This means that 
it is impossible to allocate to particular users or countries portions 
of the joint global cost.  Further, there are also some aspects of 
 
for example, the pharmaceutical industry.  By setting a non-market price, 
the government subsidizes exports at the expense of the manufacturer.  
Parallel imports of products ‘specifically’ subsidized in this manner might 
be regulated in light of long-standing WTO policy regarding export subsi-
dies.   
Abbott,  First Report (Final) To The Committee on International Trade Law Of The 
International Association On The Subject Of Parallel Importation,  supra note 182 , 
at 623. 
193. See Danzon, The Economic of Parallel Trade, supra note 6, at 295-96; 
Danzon, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULATION, supra note 28, at  7-9 (note: Dan-
zon’s estimates assume a 46 percent corporate tax rate and 10 percent cost of capi-
tal.) 
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production and distribution which also are in effect global joint 
costs as, for example, when a single plant supplies a number of 
drugs to multiple countries.  The difficulty of pricing to cover joint 
costs is exacerbated by the reality that most of these costs are al-
ready sunk by the time the product is launched and price negotia-
tions ensue.  As Danzon explains: 
The cost structure of the research-based pharmaceutical in-
dustry is markedly different from that of most other indus-
tries because of the significance of joint costs, some of 
which cannot meaningfully be attributed to any single 
product, and certainly not to a specific dosage form sold to 
a specific market segment in a particular country.  Most of 
the costs of research and development, including the cost of 
the many compounds that never make it to market, are joint 
costs to all users.  Those costs of obtaining information are 
a pure public good: they are the same whether one patient 
or millions of patients use the drug.194 
Danzon estimates that true short-term marginal costs—
secondary production, processing, packaging and some promo-
tion—account for roughly 30 percent of the total cost.  The tempta-
tion and danger for the pharmaceutical companies is that users and 
government regulators have a great incentive to free ride by at-
tempting to drive the price down to a level that covers only short-
term marginal costs.  If all users drove this bargain, then revenue 
shortfall could be as high as 70 percent; if prices covered all costs 
except R&D, the shortfall would be roughly 30 percent.195 
Whatever the individual circumstances, the basic economic fact 
is that over the long haul if a firm is to survive the average costs 
across all units of production in all markets must be sufficient to 
cover the average total cost, including the sunk joint costs. 
This reality is one important foundation for the patent system, 
which grants limited market exclusivity as a means of enabling the 
patent holders, for a fixed period of time, to price above marginal 
costs and generate the revenue for R&D and other global joint 
 
194. Patricia M. Danzon, The Uses and Abuses of International Price Compari-
sons, supra note 185, at 100. 
195. See Danzon, Economics of Parallel Trade,  supra note 6, at 295-97. 
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costs. 
The global nature of the pharmaceutical industry and the drugs 
it produces, combined with the high ratio of sunk R&D joint costs, 
renders the industry particularly vulnerable to the negative long-
term effects of parallel trade.  Economic theory, however, for some 
years has offered a plausible strategy for achieving both high con-
sumer welfare results and revenue sufficient to cover joint costs: 
so-called Ramsey pricing.196 
First utilized for regulated utility (air flight, electricity) pricing, 
Ramsey pricing requires that customers be charged according to 
their sensitivity to prices.  Thus, the mark-up of price over mar-
ginal cost will be greater for consumers who are relatively price in-
sensitive (inelastic demand) than for those who are more price sen-
sitive(elastic demand).  The more efficient outcome stems from the 
fact that price differential lead both the price sensitive and the 
price insensitive consumers to reduce their demand by an equal 
amount relative to the hypothetical price equal to marginal cost.  
With a uniform price, price sensitive users will reduce their con-
sumption more and will have their economic welfare reduced by 
more than price insensitive users.  They may drop out of the mar-
ket entirely, though they might have been willing to pay an inter-
mediate price that still covered the marginal cost of serving them. 
For this article, it is also important to note that with differential 
pricing, total revenue is higher because the price insensitive con-
sumers pay more and more of the price sensitive consumers stay in 
the market.  Over time, the higher flow of revenue will pay for a 
higher rate of R&D investment.  Thus, we agree with Stefan Szy-
manski who has argued that: 
Exhaustion [of patent rights] reduces the incentive to inno-
vate because the expected profitability of innovation is re-
duced.  Even if innovation occurs, exhaustion may well 
limit the diffusion of the benefits because it limits the in-
centive of IPR holders to serve consumers in low valuation 
 
196. See F. P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation,  ECON. J. 47-
61 (1927).  For a more contemporary analysis, see Tirole, supra note 161.  Danzon, 
also explains the theory behind Ramsey pricing as it relates to pharmaceuticals in 
Economics of Parallel Importing,  supra note 6, at 297-98. 
GROOMBRIDGE.TYPMOCK.DOC 10/3/2006  1:33 PM 
1999] PARALLEL TRADE & PHARMACEUTICALS 251 
markets.  These potential costs should weigh heavily with 
policy makers.  Innovation and creativity are central to the 
process of economic development and should be highly 
prized both in rich and poor countries.  Policies that tend to 
undermine these activities must be seen to produce signifi-
cant and substantial countervailing benefits if they are to be 
adopted.197 
2.  Implications for Consumer Economic Welfare 
Even if one ignores producer surplus and focuses only on con-
sumer economic welfare, there are strong reasons to believe that 
parallel imports will help consumers in neither developed nor de-
veloping countries.198  Consumers in developed countries would 
suffer over the long-term as declines in R&D would bring fewer 
new therapies to the market.  Moreover, given extensive govern-
ment involvement in pricing, parallel imports will do little to help 
patients.  With this in mind, Burstall and Senior point out that: 
“Doctors and patients may not profit from parallel trade but the 
distributors—the wholesalers, the dispensers in the high street or in 
hospitals, and, of course, the traders themselves—very definitely 
do.”199  While empirical evidence is difficult to come by, one of 
the most comprehensive studies on this matter conducted by those 
at the National Economic Research Associates found similarly 
that: “the major beneficiaries of parallel trade are the parallel trad-
ers who, on average, claim about 70 percent of the price difference 
between a parallel import product and the local price.  Other direct 
beneficiaries are pharmacists and, to a much lesser extent, payors.  
The consumer hardly benefits at all.”200 
 
197. Szymanski,  International Exhaustion, at 13-14. 
198. See Danzon,  The Economics of Parallel Trade, supra note 6, at 304. 
199. Burstall and Senior, supra note 31, at 22. 
200. National Economic Research Associates (NERA), Survey of Parallel 
Trade, supra note 25, Key Conclusions. 
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The most negative impact of parallel trade, though, would be 
on consumers in the developing world, because the be convergence 
of prices would “inflict a tragic loss on poorer countries that could 
no longer afford innovative therapies.”201  Pharmaceutical compa-
nies “have an incentive to set lower prices in low-income countries 
as long as parallel trade does not exist, so developing countries pay 
lower prices compared to high-income countries.”202  For example, 
pharmaceutical companies have reduced by 50 to 75 percent the 
prices of HIV/AIDS drugs destined for developing countries.  
Conversely, though, the threat of parallel trade takes away any in-
centives of pharmaceutical patent holders to make significant con-
cessions to poorer countries.203 
The evidence on whether pharmaceutical companies would not 
supply drugs to low-priced markets where the threat of parallel im-
portation is high is mixed, and often depends on the type of drug.  
In some cases, for non-essential drugs, pharmaceutical companies 
have been reluctant to supply markets.  In France, for example, 
Glaxo-Wellcome’s “refusal to accept a relatively low price for its 
new migraine drug Imigran has delayed launch for several years 
despite marketing approval.”204  Other companies have also appar-
ently delayed releasing some drugs, or adopted a uniform price as 
Merck did when it released Crixivan in the EU in 1996.205  For 
most drugs, however, “the major firms have been very reluctant to 
take such steps.  Commercial judgments have played their part, but 
so have ethical considerations.  To deny the sick medicines is not 
the way they act.”206 
Outside of the economic rationale, however, there are other 
important reasons why patent holders should have control over 
parallel importation through the use of territorial vertical restraints.  
First, as discussed above on a theoretical level, territorial vertical 
restraints give an incentive to distributors “to provide extensive 
 
201. Danzon, The Uses and Abuses of International Price Comparisons, supra 
note 185, at 102. 
202. Rozek and Berkowitz, supra note 173, at 215-16. 
203. See Bale, supra note 41. 
204. DANZON, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULATION, supra note 28, at 87. 
205. See Danzon,  The Economics of Parallel Trade, supra note 6, at 300. 
206. Burstall and Senior, supra note 31, at 66. 
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services for pharmacies (including hospital pharmacies) that they 
supply exclusively.”207  They would be less willing to do so, how-
ever, if there were a credible threat that unauthorized distributors 
could free-ride on the services and not incur the costs.  As Rozek 
and Rapp suggest: 
In order for a pharmaceutical distributor to furnish health care 
providers with the information that generates sales of a product and 
to monitor the experience of the product in a country, the distribu-
tor must have the proper incentive.  Namely, the distributor must 
be allowed to make the sales of the product associated with its dis-
seminating information about the product and monitoring reactions 
and product quality.  If a parallel trader does not provide the in-
formation or service, but rather rides free on the authorized phar-
maceutical distributor, the authorized distributor will eventually 
stop providing the information and service.208 
One would be hard pressed to argue that consumer welfare 
would benefit under such a regime.  Indeed, as noted above in the 
theoretical discussion, there is reason to believe that vertical terri-
torial restraints actually have a procompetitive impact because they 
promote interbrand competition.  Critics of the argument advanced 
here often ignore this point.  Abbott, for example, likens price dis-
crimination supplied through territorial vertical restraints as “quo-
tas” which limit the supply of a good in a particular market.  In his 
own words: 
The theory of beneficial price discrimination seems to be 
fundamentally at odds with the theory of comparative ad-
vantage and the underlying economic premise of the 
GATT-WTO trading system.  Since quotas are as a general 
proposition prohibited by the GATT 1994, business enter-
prises are in general precluded from engaging in overt price 
discrimination between markets, except to the extent that 
transport and related costs allow some price differentials to 
exist.209 
 
207. Caves et al., supra note 163, at 9. 
208. Rozek and Rapp, supra note 152, at 190. 
209. Abbott, Discussion Paper for Conference on Exhaustion of Intellectual 
Property Rights and Parallel Importation in World Trade,  supra note 19, at 10. 
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Holding territorial vertical restraints synonymous with quotas 
is categorically wrong.  In the first place, quotas are supplied by 
governments, in this case, it is the pharmaceutical manufacturer 
making the decision.  Second, quotas apply to overall goods, not 
specific brand names.  This point is crucial because it again reflects 
the narrowness with which some think of contestable markets.  
Patent holder control over parallel imports while restricting in-
trabrand competition does nothing to limit, much less impose a 
quota, on interbrand competition. 
Indeed, as discussed above on a theoretical level, territorial 
vertical restraints actually make markets more contestable by pro-
moting interbrand competition.  When distributors are secure that 
their marketing and dissemination of information on therapies will 
not be taken advantage of by unauthorized distributors, they will 
be able to introduce more effectively new products.  As Rozek and 
Rapp continue, this will actually serve to increase consumer eco-
nomic and physical welfare in the pharmaceutical industry: 
Restraints on intrabrand competition—in the form of paral-
lel imports—will tend to enhance interbrand, therapeutic 
competition.  Absent free riding, distributors can reap the 
full benefits of their market development efforts.  They will 
efficiently promote their products in competition with other 
brands available in the country.  Consumers benefit from 
competition in the form of the number of options available 
to treat a given problem at competitive prices.210 
This debate at the international level mirrors that which takes 
place in a domestic context.  Theoretically, the issue is the same 
given that “the ‘free-rider’ problems that give rise to exclusive dis-
tribution arrangements are no less important in international com-
merce than in domestic commerce. Just as domestic suppliers util-
ize vertical restraints on domestic distributors, many domestic 
suppliers utilize vertical restraints on foreign distributors as well.  
For this reason, as Malueg and Schwartz argue, the efficiencies of 
territorial restraints “are likely to be at least as great in the interna-
tional context as within countries, given that substantial country-
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specific investments are often required to introduce new products 
and that such investments are often best elicited by awarding sole-
import distributorships.”211 
3.  Health and Safety Concerns 
Parallel trade in pharmaceuticals raises safety concerns as well.  
The distribution chain in the pharmaceutical industry is critical to 
maintaining the quality and safety of drugs.  For example, some 
drugs must be stored within a particular temperature range.  In a 
world where patent holders could not control parallel imports, it 
would be very difficult to monitor, much less enforce these re-
quirements.  Parallel imports also can overburden customs officials 
who would have a difficult time distinguishing between legitimate 
parallel imports and counterfeit products.  The packaging varies 
not only in language but in the number of units in a box, the 
amount of active ingredient, etc., which is a reflection of doctors’ 
and patients’ preferences and national regulations.  For a variety of 
reasons then, Danzon argues that: 
[C]onsumers may face increase in health risk, if the parallel 
imports include counterfeit products of inferior quality, if 
repackaging makes it harder to trace specific batches in the 
event of a recall or if consumers misuse the product be-
cause the labelling is literally in Greek.  Although parallel 
importers are required to obtain a license, chemical testing 
for equivalence is not performed, and instances of counter-
feit production have occurred.212 
Empirically, for example, the NERA study of parallel importa-
tion in Europe found “a number of parallel import products whose 
repackaging by the parallel importer did not conform to legal re-
quirements” and that some had an “inaccurate description of the 
active ingredient.”  Specifically, the report cited “numerous exam-
ples of faulty batch-numbering such as different batch numbers on 
the blister and the box which could become dangerous in the event 
of recall; adaptation of original batch numbers to those of the im-
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porter; and absence of leaflets.”213 
Government officials in both developed and developing coun-
tries have voiced their concern over the health risk of parallel im-
ports as well for several reasons.  First, it would foster the growth 
of counterfeit drugs of questionable safety.  Customs officials 
would find it very difficult to distinguish between counterfeit and 
legitimate products traded in a parallel fashion.  Second, the proper 
storage and handling of legitimate pharmaceuticals cannot be guar-
anteed.  With these and other considerations in mind, one drug 
regulatory official in Kenya observed that: 
[T]he reality of parallel imports raises a number of addi-
tional problems from a regulatory standpoint: 1) the appli-
cation of double standards for approved packaging and la-
beling; 2) required cooperation of manufacturers and 
distributors in determining counterfeit products; 3) patient 
confusion due to multiple presentations of the same prod-
uct; 4) the persistent threat of intellectual property in-
fringement challenges; 5) the inability of the Pharmacy and 
Poisons Board to ascertain that the parallel import was 
manufactured with GMP (Good Manufacturing Practice) 
standards; and 6) in the event of quality control problems 
there was an inability to implement necessary product re-
call policies.214 
B.  Public vs. Private Enforcement of Territorial Vertical 
Restraints 
Interestingly, some acknowledge the logic of the argumentation 
presented above, but are nervous about who imposes or helps to 
enforce the contract establishing the territorial vertical restraint.  
Some argue that the vertical territorial allocation of distribution of 
IPRs owners can be accomplished by significantly less trade re-
strictive means, i.e., by private contract establishing exclusive sales 
 
213. National Economic Research Associates (NERA), Survey of Parallel 
Trade, supra note 30, at 18. 
214. Letter from Director, National Quality Control Laboratory, Nairobi, Kenya 
to Director, Medicines Control Council, Cape Town, South Africa, October 14, 
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territories for authorized sellers.”215 
Contrary to this assertion, there is overwhelming empirical 
evidence that private court ordering is not efficacious; indeed, in 
many cases it is near impossible.  Even those skeptical of the ar-
gument advanced here claim that manufacturers “obviously find it 
difficult to impose contractual limitations on domestic import-
ers.”216  There are two reasons why national governments and in-
ternational agreements such as TRIPS should codify the legality of 
restrictions on parallel imports rather than rely on private contrac-
tual enforcement of contractual vertical restraints.  The first is that 
the legal structures of some developing countries make it difficult, 
and in some cases impossible, to enforce contracts privately.  As 
Chard et al. note: “a number of developing countries have laws 
concerning licensing arrangements that prevent rights-owners from 
enforcing contractual restraints on exports . . . .  Thus, rights-
owners may find it particularly difficult to restrain parallel imports 
from these countries if the principle of exhaustion is extended in-
ternationally.”217 
The second reason is that “even if enforcement of contractual 
restraints on parallel exports is legal under national laws, there 
may be problems in tracing the source of parallel imports and 
hence the party who is in breach of contract.”218  Put differently, 
the transaction costs of monitoring and enforcing vertical restraints 
are too high to realistically enforce privately at this time.  Thus, 
thinking of restrictions on parallel imports in the same way as pro-
tection like the imposition of a quota as Abbott does confuses gov-
ernment enforcement of property rights with government protec-
tion and ignores that governments have an enormous cost 
advantage over world-wide policing by manufacturers. 
Some still advocate that a private solution is possible is the be-
lief that the world is moving to one uniform market and that in-
creasingly firms will be able to adopt a single pricing policy in all 
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markets.  While it is true that the economies of different nations 
are becoming increasingly integrated, it is wrong to think that we 
are at a point where a universal and uniform global market exists.  
Some argue that a single pricing policy would eliminate the paral-
lel import problem, but it would also eliminate the efficiencies re-
alized through strategic pricing.  Moreover, it reflects a naive un-
derstanding of marketplace realities given that price variations 
stem from a number of causes including differences in local de-
mand, local ability to pay, local taxes, local regulations and inter-
national treaty obligations, local manufacturing and distribution 
costs, and local infrastructure. 
Interestingly, proponents of removing restrictions on parallel 
imports often acknowledge that vertical restraints serve a pro-
competitive role.  Ruff, for example, argues that government re-
strictions on parallel imports are unnecessary because the private 
sector can eliminate them through vertical restraints.  In his own 
words: “separate restrictions on parallel imports contribute nothing 
to efficiencies produced through combined vertical restraints.  By 
the time a manufacturer has instituted a dynamic system to provide 
quasi-rents, she will have controlled for the kind of price competi-
tion represented by parallel imports.”219  Similarly, Abbott in lik-
ening patents to copyright, argues that territorial vertical restraints 
might be efficiency enhancing but, “while this argumentation may 
indeed support contractual vertical territorial restraints on the in-
ternational plane, it does not make the case against the market po-
licing function of parallel imports.”220 
This leads to the interesting question of whether it is the verti-
cal arrangement itself that is the problem, or the supplier (i.e., the 
government of the patent owner herself through private contract) 
of the vertical arrangement that poses the problem.  Theoretically, 
vertical restraints contracted privately should also result in similar 
types of abusive price discrimination as vertical restraints imposed 
by the government.  Both Ruff and Abbott express concern about 
abusive and anti-competitive price discrimination.  But if this is 
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their concern, then they should oppose abusive vertical restraints 
regardless of whether it is imposed by government allowances of 
private contractual restraints or directly by the private sector itself. 
There is an important reason to distinguish between vertical ar-
rangements sanctioned by the government versus those contracted 
for in the private sector—but the distinction is one that ultimately 
makes the case for why legal rules are crucial.  There is a strong 
case to be made for market failure in protecting intellectual prop-
erty rights, particularly at the international level.  As Alden Abbott 
observes: 
The key principle that emerges from this discussion is that 
it is much more difficult to arrange privately for the protec-
tion of intangible knowledge goods than for that of tangible 
goods.  While purely private methods of protecting intellec-
tual property should be allowed, innovators should also 
have an opportunity to avail themselves of guaranteed pro-
tection under intellectual property law—a form of protec-
tion that may often prove more conducive to desirable in-




221. Alden F. Abbott, supra note 55, at 322.  Ironically, to the extent that it is 
vertical restraints that indeed are the problem, some suggest that fears of price dis-
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property protection exists.”  Id. at 321. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is interesting to note the language used to couch debates over 
intellectual property and international trade.  Do intellectual prop-
erty rights grant a monopoly, a term which has negative connota-
tions, or is it better to conceptualize intellectual property rights as 
any other private property right, albeit only temporary?  Are phar-
maceutical patent holders controlling the flow of their products or 
are they restricting free trade?  This choice of words clearly reflect 
the tensions and deep divisions within the international trading 
community.  As always, it is necessary to balance goals.  In the 
case of intellectual property, as Rothnie argues: “There is no point 
in railing at intellectual property rights because they distort the op-
eration of market forces; that is, the point of adopting intellectual 
property laws.  On the other hand, it is necessary to recognize that 
not every use made of intellectual property rights should be ac-
corded immunity.”222 
In achieving this proper balance and reconciling these tensions, 
it is important to look at circumstances unique to particular forms 
of intellectual property, as well as the unique characteristics of par-
ticular industries.  We firmly believe that the research-based phar-
maceutical industry represents a case where a doctrine of interna-
tional exhaustion permitting parallel trade would have a negative 
impact on global welfare.  This article emphasizes global welfare 
because proponents of parallel trade too often only consider the 
short-term welfare implications of consumers in particular locales.  
It is noteworthy too that the available evidence of the European 
Union suggests that consumers in the more developed countries of 
Europe have seen little of the price reduction due to parallel 
trade—instead, parallel traders and some unauthorized distributors 
have realized most of the gains.  These short-term gains to middle-
persons, however, come at a considerable cost. 
This article has attempted to document the central role of the 
patent system in fostering and maintaining a stream of innovative 
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drugs from the pharmaceutical industry.  There is a growing con-
sensus among economists that, particularly with regard to the 
pharmaceutical industry, the symbiotic relationship between the 
property rights granted through patents and the simultaneous in-
crement to the nation’s ‘knowledge base’ through publication of 
the patent, contributes strongly to technological advancement and 
higher economic growth.  Moreover, an effective distribution sys-
tem is critically important for pharmaceutical manufacturers to re-
alize profits on a very few products in a very short period of time.  
Consequently, if one looks at global welfare, however, as Danzon 
argues: “The welfare maximizing set of prices to cover joint costs 
requires charging different prices to users who differ in their price 
elasticities of demand for innovative medicines.”223  In a world of 
parallel trade, though, legitimate forms of price of discrimination 
would not be allowed. 
Of course, as discussed above, the price differentials of phar-
maceuticals across markets often have little to do with the pricing 
strategies of pharmaceutical firms; rather, it is based on govern-
ment intervention.  The result is that parallel trade is doing very lit-
tle to create a uniform market as hoped for by proponents of a doc-
trine of international exhaustion.  Nowhere is this more evident 
than in the European Union, which has a doctrine of internal or re-
gional exhaustion for member states.  Interestingly, in his exhaus-
tive survey of several industries, Rothnie concludes with regard to 
the pharmaceutical industry that: “More than the other aspects of 
the study, the examination of the pharmaceuticals industry shows 
both the fallacy and danger of a doctrine of international exhaus-
tion.”224  A fallacy in the sense that the EU is not a uniform mar-
ket; a danger in the sense that a burgeoning parallel trade industry 
in pharmaceuticals could leave some markets unserved and risk the 
health and safety of consumers through faulty packaging and coun-
terfeiting.  For this reason, as Bale concludes, the EU is an exam-
ple of what not to do: impose parallel trade for a sector on a system 
of existing national price controls and the continuation of gross dif-
ferences in IPR protection.225 
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Again, as critics of the argument advanced here point out, this 
does not mean that intellectual property should be the only lens 
through which we observe the issue.  There are legitimate concerns 
that consumer welfare could suffer unduly if firms were engaging 
in abusive price discrimination.  The authors acknowledge the 
theoretical possibility of abusive price discrimination in any indus-
try.  The work on this subject, though, overwhelmingly shows that 
it is most likely to occur in industries which are heavily concen-
trated where only a few firms dominate because collusion and car-
tels are much easier to maintain.  This is not the case, however, in 
the research-based pharmaceutical industry, where the top firm 
does not even have a 5 percent market share.  Moreover, the in-
creasingly shortened periods of market exclusivity for a particular 
therapeutic drug suggest that competition is alive and well in the 
industry.  Given the number of competitors, pharmaceutical manu-
facturers have little incentive, much less ability, to price discrimi-
nate in an abusive fashion—doing so would only encourage entry 
by others. 
This does not mean that pharmaceutical manufacturers or their 
distributors are completely off the hook.  Price fixing behavior 
through a cartel by manufacturers or distributors is illegal—and 
should be.  Fortunately, countries have a body of anti-trust laws to 
deal with such illegal and anti-competitive behavior.  Undermining 
the efficient and pro-competitive benefits of territorial vertical re-
straints, however, as Chard et al., conclude, “risks throwing out the 
baby with the bath water.  Competition policy is the most appro-
priate policy for dealing with those relatively infrequent situations 
where the use of intellectual property rights to prevent parallel im-
portation has detrimental effects.”226  Such competition provisions 
“would ensure that the economic functions of the intellectual prop-
erty rights are adequately protected (while under an exhaustion 
rule, they are not) and, at the same time, it would provide for ap-
propriate control of any abuses of intellectual property rights.”227  
It was with this in mind that Posner concluded that vertical re-
straints should be legal per se.  While speaking to the case of the 
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U.S., his analysis would apply equally to the international level.  
As he notes, “cases in which dealers or distributors collude to 
eliminate competition among themselves and bring in the manufac-
turer to enforce their cartel, or in which vertical restrictions are 
used to enforce a cartel among manufacturers, can be dealt with 
under the conventional rules applicable to horizontal price-fixing 
conspiracies.”228 
Specifically with regard to the current situation in the TRIPS 
Agreement, where Article 6 merely records a standoff between 
those opposing and those favoring restrictions on parallel imports, 
we believe that there is a great danger that in the near future bilat-
eral and even regional conflicts will erupt that could undermine le-
gitimacy of the TRIPS itself.  It is, therefore, imperative that the 
WTO move quickly to fill the gap concerning restrictions on paral-
lel imports.  Given the arguments advanced in this article, our first 
preference would be for a rule allowing IPRs holder to block paral-
lel imports.  Failing this, at a minimum to take care of the special 
problems presented for the pharmaceutical industry, a new rule for 
exhaustion should allow restrictions by patent holders on parallel 
imports that come from countries that maintain price controls, or 
other market restricting practices.  As we have argued elsewhere, 
the authors also recommend that a future regime on parallel trade 
include a competition policy test that takes into consideration mar-
ket structure and the potential ability for putative collusive behav-
ior.  In countering such collusion governments should have the 
ability to apply competition rules.229 
In conclusion, the authors reiterate that the debate on parallel 
trade is part of the larger debate on deeper integration and the 
globalization of the world economy.  And while elsewhere we 
have argued vociferously in favor of free trade, our analysis sug-
gests, in agreement with Danzon, that: “The first best policy option 
would be to exempt pharmaceuticals from parallel trade.”230  The 
world is not yet a uniform market where consumers have similar 
tastes, regulatory policies are harmonized, and all countries have 
 
228. Posner, supra note 130, at 22. 
229. See Barfield and Groombridge, supra note 5. 
230. DANZON, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULATION, supra note 28, at 89. 
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strong regimes to protect intellectual property.  At this time, as 
court ordering through private contract is not feasible given differ-
ent legal regimes and the inordinately high transaction costs, gov-
ernment rules are necessary.  Government rules allowing pharma-
ceutical patent holders to control parallel trade are vital not only to 
promoting innovation, but to enhancing consumer economic and 
physical welfare in both the developed and developing world. 
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APPENDIX 
 






















3.5%  /  #4 4.2%  /  #3 4.6%  /  #1 
Glaxo Well-
come 
4.8%  /  #1 4.6%  /  #1 4.5%  /  #2 
Novartis 4.7%  /  #2 4.4%  /  #2 4.3%  /  #3 
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
3.5%  /  #5 3.5%  /  #4 3.7%  /  #4 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
2.7%  /  #9 3.4%  /  #5 3.5%  /  #5 
Pfizer 2.6%  /  #10 3.2%  /  #7 3.4%  /  #6 
American 
Home 
3.4%  /  #6 3.3%  /  #6 3.3%  /  #7 
Smithkline 
Beecham 
2.9%  /  #8 2.8%  /  #9 3.0%  /  #8 
Hoechst 3.8%  /  #3 3.2%  /  #8 2.8%  /  #9 
Lilly 2.2%  /  #13 2.3%  /  #12 2.6%  /  #10 
Roche 2.9%  /  #7 2.6%  /  #10 2.6%  /  #11 
Abbott 1.8%  /  #16 2.3%  /  #11 2.5%  /  #12 
Scherling 
Plough 
1.8%  /  #15 2.1%  /  #15 2.3%  /  #13 
 
231. See IMS Health, Insight for Life, Global Services: World Review 1997,  
This table represents data from 60 countries. 
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Bayer 2.2%  /  #12 2.2%  /  #13 2.2%  /  #14 
Astra 1.4%  /  #19 2.1%  /  #14 2.1%  /  #15 
Warner-
Lambert 
1.5%  /  #18 1.5%  /  #20 1.9%  /  #16 
Rhone 
Poulenc 
2.0%  /  #14 1.9%  /  #16 1.8%  /  #17 
Pharmacia & 
Upjohn 
2.3%  /  #11 1.8%  /  #17 1.8%  /  #18 
Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
1.4%  /  #20 1.5%  /  #19 1.5%  /  #19 
Takeda 1.5%  /  #17 1.5%  /  #18 1.4%  /  #20 
TOTAL 20 52.9% 54.1% 55.7% 
 
 
